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Abstract
Three Essays on Transfers, Trade Policy and Welfare
Jonathan Munemo
The objective of this dissertation is to incorporate structural factors in the analysis
of welfare and trade policies of developing countries. The first chapter gives an
introduction to this study. Chapter two provides an analysis of the welfare effect of
financial transfers and capital transfers in the presence of trade taxes. We build a twogood general equilibrium model, which takes into account the use of foreign capital in the
import competing sector and the use of land in the exporting sector by developing
countries. Labor is used in both sectors.

Financial transfers induce changes in

commodity terms of trade, which in turn affects capital inflows and the price of imported
capital. The welfare effect of financial transfers is considered in the context of induced
changes in these variables. In the context of an exogenous export tax, we find that
endogenous capital flows aggravate the transfer problem that exists under trade taxation.
When trade liberalization is tied to financial aid, we find that the tying of aid may worsen
or alleviate the transfer problem, depending on how the existing export tax compares with
the optimum. In the case of capital transfers, we find that such transfers can reduce
welfare through an adverse price effect and a production distortion.
In chapter three, we build an econometric model and empirically analyze the
transfer problem in the presence of an exogenous export tax and endogenous capital
inflows. This is done by estimating a regression model with fixed effects for a panel of 14
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Our empirical results show that multilateral
transfers significantly reduce terms of trade. The reduction in terms of trade significantly
induces foreign capital inflows. Increased capital inflows and terms of trade deterioration
significantly offset the real GDP gains from multilateral transfers. The results are found
to be robust. Chapter four analyzes how trade liberalization affects labor under-utilization
(underemployment) and welfare. We show that liberalizing trade by reducing export
taxes has an ambiguous effect on the welfare of a small open economy due to the
presence of endogenous underemployment. In fact, free trade is not optimal: we find that
a small export tax leads to a welfare improvement. Our results also show that the

structure of employment in a typical small open economy causes trade liberalization to
increase rather than decrease the level of underemployment. We check to see whether
this latter result holds empirically by estimating a regression model with fixed effects for
a panel of 19 developing economies. The empirical analysis shows that the result holds
and is robust. In chapter five, we summarize the main conclusions of the dissertation and
discuss future research.
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CHAPTER 1

Introduction, Review of Literature and Overview of the Dissertation

1.1.

Introduction
A number of developing countries are recipients of multilateral transfers. The

term “multilateral transfers” refers to loans and credits from the International Monetary
Fund and the World Bank. These transfers are an important source of income and thus
welfare, given that most recipients are very poor in terms of per capita income. Most of
the developing countries receiving international transfers have also embarked on trade
liberalization. Liberalization of trade is the key component of a wider package of policy
reforms. A study by Thomas (1989) shows that the vast majority of World Bank loans
require a country to have a trade liberalization component in order to receive the loans.
The overriding objective of policy reforms is to achieve sustained growth in per capita
income that would translate into welfare gains (Corbo and Fischer, 1995). Multilateral
transfers provide the bulk of income required for financing the policy reforms.1
Multilateral transfers to developing countries have traditionally been measured on
the basis of the OECD’s Official Development Assistance (ODA). ODA is made up of
official financial flows in the form of grants and highly concessional loans. A loan is
considered to be highly concessional if it has a grant element of at least 25 percent.
Transfers are then measured by the net ODA, which is the net amount actually disbursed.
Net ODA is however not very useful for analyzing the welfare effect of transfers. This is
1

External finance is important because many developing countries are too poor to meet the financing
requirements of policy reforms (see for example Helleiner, 1992). Other external resource flows into
developing countries include bilateral lending, foreign direct investment, portfolio equity flows, bond
issues, commercial bank lending and other private lending.
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because net ODA includes both grants and concessional loans. Such an aggregation
overestimates the true aid content of loans. Only grants should be used to measure the
aid content of loans because they represent pure unrequited transfers. Loans have to be
repaid and therefore should not be considered to be part of a nation’s income. An
alternative approach to measuring aid flows is to use the World Bank (1998)’s Effective
Development Assistance (EDA) data. EDA is an aggregate measure of aid flows
combining total grants and the grant equivalents of all official loans. It thus captures the
pure transfers from donors to recipients. Using EDA is therefore more useful for
analyzing the welfare impact of multilateral transfers.
Multilateral transfers are financed by donor governments of rich nations. These
donor governments have their own programs for delivering bilateral transfers. Bilateral
transfers refer to loans and credits from governments including grants. Why is it that
donor nations disburse some of their transfers through multilateral agencies rather than
through their own bilateral programs? Rodrik (1995) suggests that information gathering
and monitoring as well as conditionality provide the rationale for multilateral lending.
The level of bilateral as well as private transfers to developing countries is
influenced by many factors. A crucial factor is the nature of government macro and micro
economic policies in the developing countries. These transfers tend to be deterred from
countries with risky policy environments. However, gathering information about policies
as well as monitoring these policies is best performed by multilateral agencies. Such
information is a public good in the sense that once available, it benefits everybody. As a
result, individual donors have no incentive to gather this kind of information. Multilateral
institutions do not face this incentive problem.
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In addition, multilateral agencies are better able to conduct policy monitoring since they
are able to internalize informational externalities.
However, one can argue that the informational role of multilateral institutions by
itself is not enough to justify multilateral lending. This role could have been easily
performed without any lending involved. Rodrik (1995) notes that in the absence of
multilateral lending, there is no incentive for these agencies to perform their information
gathering and monitoring functions effectively. The reason is that if the agencies’ own
money is not at stake, chances are that they may be influenced by political and personal
factors. As such, multilateral lending acts as an incentive for reliable information
gathering and policy monitoring.
Conditionality refers to lending that is tied to changes in government policies.
Rodrik (1995) notes that conditionality in lending is necessary to deal with the timeinconsistency problem. If there is no conditionality, developing countries can promise to
undertake policy changes ex ante (before receiving the transfers) and then not pursue
these policy changes ex post (after receiving the transfers). A follow-up question is why
this conditionality role is not performed by the donor nations themselves. Rodrik (1995)
suggests that multilateral conditionality is politically more acceptable than conditionality
from rich industrial countries. The reason is that multilateral institutions are perceived as
being autonomous from the political influence of industrial nations.
An analysis of the distribution of multilateral transfers and bilateral transfers
supports the view that the former is less driven by political factors than the latter. Rodrik
(1995) shows that the distribution of bilateral transfers is heavily concentrated in regions
of political or strategic interest to the donor nation. For example, US transfers are found
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to be concentrated in the Middle East, Japan’s transfers on east and southeast Asia and
European Union transfers on Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).

Rodrik (1995) finds no

evidence of such regional biases in multilateral transfers. Note however that if there are
no incentive problems, conditionality need not be accompanied by lending activities.
Multilateral agencies could as well negotiate policy changes to be implemented, while
lending is provided by bilateral donors. However, if the multilateral agencies’ resources
are not at stake, there is no incentive for these agencies to enforce the desired policy
changes. Therefore putting their own resources at stake ensures that multilateral agencies
take policy conditionality seriously.
The rational for multilateral transfers can also be understood by analyzing what
determines the transfers made by multilateral agencies to developing countries. Frey and
Schneider (1986) provide four competing models of international lending activity. These
are the needs model, the deserts model, the benevolence model, and the political
economy model.
According to the needs model, multilateral agencies give transfers to countries
which need them most. This view is certainly consistent with the period after 1970, when
most transfers were given to poor countries. Based on the needs model, we would expect
that transfers will be much higher in countries with low income per capita, high rates of
inflation and high external debt. Therefore healthy indicators such as balance of
payments surpluses and budget surpluses would imply that there is no need to offer large
transfers.
The deserts model posits that transfers are given to countries which deserve them
most. Nations are deemed deserving of transfers if they have potential for development
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and are creditworthy. Therefore sound economic and financial policies are rewarded
with higher transfers. Indicators of creditworthiness include low inflation, a budget
surplus, balance of payments surplus and low external debt. Low inflation indicates that a
government has financially responsible policies. A surplus in the government budget
shows that the government has savings. Balance of payments surpluses indicate a
successful export policy while a low external debt indicates that a country can develop
using internal resources. Good performance in the past also implies higher transfers
because it proves that a country has the capability to do well in the future. In addition, a
sound policy also implies that a country maintains political stability.
The benevolence model takes the view that officials of multilateral agencies are
benevolent in the sense that their objective is to fulfill the agencies’ goals. Some of these
goals include promotion of economic growth and promotion of international trade. It
follows therefore that countries with low per capita incomes are expected to receive more
transfers. In addition, more open regimes are expected to receive higher transfers.
The political economy model regards multilateral institutions as bureaucracies in
which the top officials maximize their individual utility subject to economic and political
constraints. Top officials derive their utility from their prestigious positions and lending
power. Prestige comes from the agencies’ ability to perform an excellent job in their
lending activities. This implies that the allocation of transfers to countries is expected to
be influence by development needs as well as development potential. Power comes from
the ability of top officials to use their discretion in granting transfers.

Political

constraints are caused by the interference of donor nations in the lending activities of
multilateral institutions. Such interference can arise when donors use their voting power
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to influence the lending activities of multilateral agencies. Financial constraints arise
because of the dependency on funds from donors. This means that the agencies will
sometime yield to pressure from donors for the sake of securing future funding. Frey and
Schneider (1986) test each of these models econometrically. They find that the political
economy model best explains the lending behavior of the World Bank.
A substantial amount of foreign transfers to developing countries has taken place
over the years. Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) for example has been receiving these transfers
since the onset of reforms in the early 1980s. Levy (1987) notes that SSA absorbs a large
share of total ODA disbursements, which amounted to about one third in 1983 alone.
Helleiner (1994) finds that in the early 1990s, SSA received 35% of total ODA to
developing countries, compared to less than 10% in 1960. The outcome of the transfers as
well as the reforms in terms of progress towards restoring growth in per capita income is
however disappointing. Africa remains the poorest continent in the world. Transfers and
reforms have simply not delivered the expected welfare outcomes. The same dismal
welfare result has been experienced in many other developing countries that have
received multilateral transfers, as shown by Easterly (2003).
In the literature, several explanations have been offered to account for the poor
performance of developing countries. The explanations include policy mistakes,
exogenous factors and foreign transfers themselves.

However, when analyzing the

welfare of developing nations, we have to recognize that national welfare is also affected
by structural factors. The literature in this area has not focused on how transfers and
trade policy interact with structural factors to deliver welfare outcomes. A very important
structural factor that needs to be factored into the welfare analysis is that most developing
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countries are highly dependent on imports of capital goods for production and
investment. Evidence of this high import dependency can be found in Moran (1989).
Imports of capital goods are financed using export earnings. Transfers affect the terms of
trade and hence export earnings. They can also affect the price of capital goods. The
effect on export earnings and price of capital determines the ability to import capital
goods and therefore a nation’s welfare.
The success of trade policy reforms in raising welfare and improving resource
utilization does not depend on creating liberal trade regimes alone. There are some
structural factors that need to be considered as well. A crucial structural factor is that
underemployment or labor-underutilization is very high in developing countries.2 This
implies that low unemployment rates can give a misleading picture about labor
utilization. What really matters from a welfare point of view is how trade policy affects
underemployment. The objective of this dissertation is to incorporate these structural
factors in the analysis of welfare and trade policies of developing countries.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents a review of
existing literature on the welfare effects of transfers and trade policy. In section 1.3, we
present an overview of the dissertation and outline the major results presented in this
dissertation.
1.2.

Review of related Literature
The review of literature is divided into two parts. In the first part, we review the

theoretical and empirical literature on transfers and welfare. In the second part, we

2

See for example ILO-KILM (2002).
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review the theoretical and empirical literature on trade policy and welfare. We also
discuss how this dissertation seeks to contribute to the existing literature.

1.2.1. Transfers and welfare
In the literature, there is a distinction between aid that is tied and untied aid. Aid
is said to be “tied” if its provision is made conditional on the recipient meeting conditions
imposed by the donor. Untied aid is aid that is given with no conditionality attached. The
welfare effect of aid is often analyzed using duality models. The income gains from the
transfers are clearly welfare enhancing. However, transfers can also result in a price
effect which reduces welfare. The price effect depends on the marginal propensity to
consume the recipient’s exports in both the donor and recipient nations. The theory of
transfers and welfare shows that if the marginal propensity to consume is identical in both
nations, the price effect is zero and positive income gains accrue to the recipient nation. If
the recipient’s marginal propensity to consume its exports is less than the donor’s
marginal propensity to consume these exports, then the aid induces a shift in the terms of
trade against the recipient and in favor of the donor. This is the price effect of a transfer.
The unfavorable shift in the terms of trade hurt the recipient’s welfare.3
In the case of untied aid, Samuelson (1947) showed that in a two-country model,
the recipient nation is assured of a net welfare gain only if its markets are competitive,
stable and undistorted. Gale (1974) however showed that in the presence of bystanders
(non-participating countries in the transfer), the price effect can dominate the income
effect to cause a net reduction in the welfare of the recipient nation. This rather

3

It should be noted that the negative shift in the terms of trade is highly possible in practice. This is
because many developing countries produce primary products which are mostly consumed abroad.
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paradoxical outcome is referred to as “the transfer problem” (Eaton, 1989; Jones and
Neary, 1984). Using the same model as Samuelson (1947), Kemp (1995) showed that the
tying of aid may also result in a transfer paradox even if markets are stable, undistorted
and competitive.
Gale (1974) and Kemp (1995)’s results are relevant for analyzing the effect of
multilateral transfers on the welfare of developing countries. The fact that not every
developing country receives a transfer gives rise to bystanders and as a result, transfer
paradoxes cannot be ruled out. In addition, multilateral transfers to developing countries
have policy-based conditionality as observed by Helleiner (1992) and Rodrik (1995).
Some of the policies used for tying the transfers include stabilization policies
(devaluation and complementary monetary and fiscal policies), institutional reform and
market liberalization.
The empirical effect of foreign aid on the wellbeing of developing nations has
been the subject of much debate since the 1960s. During the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s,
empirical analysis was limited by data availability and the specification of an appropriate
model was a debatable issue. A survey of this earlier literature can be found in Hansen
and Tarp (2000). Burnside and Dollar (2000) find that aid has a positive effect on per
capita growth in developing countries with good policies but has little effect in a bad
policy environment.
Many papers have built on the work of Burnside and Dollar (2000). These papers
include Hansen and Tarp (2001), Dalgaard and Hansen (2001), Guillamont and Chauvet
(2001), Collier and Dehn (2001), Lensink and White (2001) and Collier and Dollar
(2002). They introduce variations such as other exogenous variables, non-linear
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dependencies and interaction terms. Some of the findings from these papers are
consistent with the Burnside and Dollar (2000) result, while some of them are not.
Easterly (2003) finds that the Burnside and Dollar (2000) result is not robust to sample
selection and alternative definitions of policies.
Africa in particular has generated a lot of research interest because it has been a
major recipient of transfers since the early 1980s, but is still the poorest continent in the
world. To be sure, there are many factors that could have contributed to the poor
performance of Africa. Fischer and Corbo (1995) and Helleiner (1994) suggest problems
related to policy design, poor sequencing of reforms, speed of reforms, reform credibility
and weak institutions. Exogenous shocks such as unfavorable terms of trade, an increase
in interest rates on foreign debt, and civil strife have also contributed to the weak
performance (Wheeler, 1984).
Based on available cross-national data for the whole world, Easterly and Levine
(1997) explain why per capita income has remained much lower in SSA compared to the
rest of the world. The reasons are low schooling, political instability, underdeveloped
financial systems, distorted foreign exchange markets, high government deficits and poor
infrastructure. Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997) also use a global data set, but reach a
different conclusion. They argue that trade policies, geography and demography explain
why per capita income in SSA has remained low at a time when the rest of the world is
enjoying much higher per capita incomes. The combination of closed trade policies, a
tropical climate (characterized by poor health, poor soils and unreliable rainfall patterns),
many landlocked countries and high population growth is seen to have adversely affected
the wellbeing of SSA.
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Rodrik (1998) has analyzed variation in per capita income within SSA. According
to his findings, the most important factors accounting for differentials in per capita
income are: human resources (life expectancy), macro/fiscal policy (public savings),
demography (changes in the dependency ratio), export policies (export taxes) and a
catch-up/convergence factor (initial per-capita income). Collier and Gunning (1999), the
IMF (1996) and the World Bank (1981, 1994) see policy misdirection as the main
obstacle to welfare improvement. They therefore emphasize the need for policy reform.
As mentioned earlier, economies in developing countries reflect a structural
dependence on imported capital goods. Growth therefore depends on these imports.
Sustained economic growth in developing countries is expected to translate into welfare
gains. This implies that the welfare of developing countries is affected by imports of
capital goods. The above literature has not considered capital goods imports in the
analysis of the transfer problem. This dissertation seeks to contribute to the literature by
analyzing the transfer problem in the context of foreign capital goods.

2.2.2. Trade policy and welfare
Trade policy reform in developing countries aims to improve welfare by reducing
production and consumption distortions and by expanding labor intensive employment.
The trade regimes in developing economies are characterized by trade barriers such as
import tariffs, export taxes and border delays. Greenaway and Milner (1991) observe that
trade barriers are used to protect domestic industries from external competition as well as
to raise revenue. However, these trade barriers reduce welfare by distorting production
and consumption of tradable goods. High export taxes lead to under-production of export
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goods, while import tariffs and non-tariff barriers favor over-production of importcompeting goods. In addition, consumption is distorted because consumers pay a higher
price for domestic goods which would be cheaper to import in the absence of tariff and
non-tariff barriers. Reforming trade regimes by reducing trade barriers is expected to
reduce these distortions and thereby improve welfare.
A typical developing economy is characterized by a labor intensive export sector
and a capital intensive import-competing sector. The real product wage in the export
sector is expected to fall relative to the real product wage in the import-competing sector
following the liberalization of trade by reducing trade taxes. As a result, the export sector
will expand relative to the import-competing sector. These changes will benefit the
economy by increasing employment of labor.
The empirical literature has focused on how trade liberalization affects
employment or unemployment. Some studies find that trade liberalization causes
transitional unemployment as labor is reallocated out of the importables sector to the
exportables sector. Other studies find that trade liberalization has little effect on
employment or unemployment. Edwards (1993), provides a survey of this literature. To
the best of our knowledge, the effect of trade liberalization on underemployment has not
been investigated.
The employment gains from trade liberalization are achieved under the
assumption that real wages are flexible and labor is homogeneous and inter-sectorally
mobile. In reality, labor is not homogeneous. In many developing countries, the export
sector is intensive in the use of unskilled labor and the import-competing sector is
intensive in the use of skilled labor. Also, real wages are not fully flexible. Real wage
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rigidity results in underemployment or labor-underutilization. The ILO (2002) notes that
underemployment is a problem that affects the majority of the population in developing
countries. The welfare effect of trade liberalization will therefore largely depend on how
underemployment is affected. This dissertation analyzes how trade liberalization affects
underemployment and welfare.

1.3.

Overview of the dissertation
This dissertation conducts a general equilibrium analysis of the welfare effects of

transfers and trade policy. Three theoretical models are developed. The first model
considers the welfare effect of financial transfers in the presence of trade taxes and
capital flows. Our second model considers the effect of capital transfers on welfare.
Based on the theoretical analysis, we derive an empirical model which relates welfare to
transfers, trade taxes and capital flows. The empirical model is estimated using data on
SSA. Our third theoretical model looks at trade liberalization, underemployment and
welfare. The model is empirically estimated using data from a group of developing
countries. The remainder of this dissertation is structured as follows. Chapters 2, 3, and 4
present the theoretical and empirical analysis. Chapter 5 provides a summary and
conclusion of the dissertation as well as areas of future research interest. Below, is a brief
description of the contents of each chapter.
Chapter two builds a two-nation, two-good general equilibrium model. The two
nations are A and B. A is a developing nation which produces goods 1 and 2, and B is a
developed nation which also produces goods 1 and 2. Good-1 is a primary commodity
(like cocoa) and is produced using labor and land. Good-2 is a manufactured good
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produced using labor and capital.

Nation A exports good-1 to nation B and imports

good-2 from it. Also, A uses foreign capital from B in the import competing sector (i.e.,
good-2). Nation A employs export taxes, while nation B follows free trade. The model is
used to consider the welfare effect of financial transfers and capital transfers.
This model is consistent with the structure of production and trade observed in
developing and developed countries. Many developing countries produce and export
primary commodities. As noted before, trade taxes and dependence on imported capital
goods is an important feature of developing countries. Developed countries on the other
hand have much lower trade barriers. The assumption of free trade for developed
countries therefore makes sense. In addition, industrial countries import largely primary
goods from developing countries and export mainly industrial products to the developing
countries.
We already know from Brecher and Bhagwati (1982) that in the presence of trade
taxes, transfers may be recipient immiserizing. Therefore, we can expect a transfer
paradox to be possible in this case.

We find that financial transfers induce changes in

commodity terms of trade, which in turn affects capital inflows and the price of imported
capital. The welfare effect of these transfers is considered in the context of induced
changes in these variables. In the case of capital transfers, we find that such transfers are
associated with changes in prices, production and income. The impact of these changes
on welfare is analyzed.
In chapter three, we build an econometric model and empirically analyze the
transfer problem in the presence of an exogenous export tax and endogenous capital
inflows. The empirical analysis is based on SSA. As noted before, SSA has been
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receiving a large share of multilateral transfers since the early 1980s.

Like other

developing countries, SSA is highly dependent on imported capital goods that are used in
the import competing industrialized sector. Ndulu (1994) underscores the importance of
imports for investment and production in SSA. Based on Ndulu (1994), over 75% of
imports in SSA are production related.
The importance of imports in production is also reflected by the strong relationship
between incomes and imports. Lopez and Thomas (1990), find that income elasticities are
in excess of one for SSA. There is also a positive and significant relationship between
increased imports and growth as shown by Lopez and Thomas (1990), and Ndulu (1991).
In addition Thomas and Lopez (1990) find that Africa’s import-gdp ratio is around 25%.
The importance of capital goods imports cannot therefore be overemphasized. Our
empirical model is derived from the general equilibrium model discussed in chapter 2.
We estimate a regression model with fixed effects for a panel of 14 countries in SSA. The
estimation results are consistent with the theoretical analysis in chapter 2 and are robust.
Chapter four analyzes how trade liberalization affects underemployment and
welfare in a small open economy. We present a general equilibrium trade model that
explicitly takes into account the employment structure and wage inflexibility of a typical
small open economy. The model has two sectors; a labor-intensive export sector and a
capital-intensive import- competing sector. Real wages are assumed to be flexible in the
export sector and rigid in the import-competing sector. The export sector uses unskilled
labor and the import-competing sector uses skilled labor. Real wage rigidity in the skilled
sector results in underemployment.
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This model of a small open economy can be applied to developing countries as
observed by Knight (1976). Such a model can accurately assess the impact of trade
liberalization on underemployment and welfare in a situation where labor is
heterogeneous and real wage rigidity exists in some markets. If these structural factors
are ignored, we are only able to assess the effect of trade liberalization on employment.
As discussed before, such an assessment can give misleading information about labor
utilization and welfare, given that there is high underemployment in developing
countries.
Based on the general equilibrium model of a small open economy, we specify an
empirical model for analyzing the effect of trade liberalization on underemployment. The
model is also used to estimate the effects of changes in labor productivity, capital stock,
and terms of trade on underemployment. We estimate the model using panel data for a
group of developing countries for which data is available. The empirical effect of trade
liberalization on underemployment is consistent with the theoretical analysis and is
robust.
This dissertation is therefore an attempt at modeling the effect of transfers and
trade policy on the welfare of developing countries using a general equilibrium
framework. A theoretical as well as an empirical approach is used in the analysis. The
focus of the research is on developing economies. The importance of structural factors in
such an analysis is underscored. We accordingly take into account structural factors in
our analysis. The concluding chapter explores the different ways in which we plan to
extend this research.
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CHAPTER 2
Transfers, Trade Taxes and Endogenous Capital Flows
2.1.

Introduction
Before Bretton Woods, transfers in the form of multilateral lending were

uncommon. However after 1945, multilateral lending became a common practice. It was
generally believed that private capital markets could not adequately provide the resources
needed for post war reconstruction. The experience of the inter war period had shown
that private capital flows had destabilizing effects and that there were inadequate capital
markets to meet different financing requirements.
Following the completion of post war reconstruction, multilateral agencies now
play an important role in shaping the economies of developing countries. Multilateral
transfers are an important source of income in many poor developing countries. These
transfers also provide the bulk of resources need to finance economic reforms that are
being undertaken by several developing nations. The objective of these reforms is to
create sustainable growth that would translate into welfare gains and thereby reduce
poverty in the developing world.
Although multilateral agencies have disbursed significant amounts of transfers in
support of policy reforms, the general consensus in policy cycles is that the amounts
transferred so far are insufficient. There have recently been renewed calls to increase the
volume of multilateral transfers to developing countries. These calls emerged after
Burnside and Dollar (2000) showed that transfers help countries with good economic
policies. The push for more transfers was clearly reflected during the U.N. conference on
“Financing for Development” in Monterrey, Mexico (2002). The Economist Magazine
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(March 2002), recommended increased transfers on the basis of the Burnside and Dollar
(2000) paper. The Financial Times (2002) made the same point:
“..aid can help…it should be concentrated on countries with good macroeconomic
policy. Estimates by Mr. Dollar and Mr. Burnside suggest that 1 percent of gross
domestic product in aid given to a poor but well-managed country can increase its
growth rate by a sustained 0.5 percentage points.”
James Wolfensohn (2002), president of the World Bank, was explicit in recommending
larger transfers on the basis that policies had improved in poor countries and therefore
there should be “roughly a doubling of current aid flows.”
The US president, George W. Bush (2002) promised a $5 billion increase in
foreign aid based on the fact that money that is complemented by economic reforms is
not wasted. Although the Burnside and Dollar (2000) view that transfers are effective in
a good policy environment cannot be denied, it should be noted that good policies are not
the only factor that is crucial for a transfer to improve welfare. An analysis of the theory
of transfers and welfare clearly shows that there are more fundamental issues involved, as
explained in what follows next.
The issue of whether or not international transfers can change the recipient’s
welfare was at the center of the debate between Keynes (1929) and Ohlin (1929) on
German reparation payments after World War I. In principle, a transfer affects a
recipient’s welfare through an income effect and a price effect. The income effect
represents the transfer of purchasing power and is clearly welfare enhancing. On the
other hand, the price effect represents the induced change in the terms of trade.
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This price effect depends on the marginal propensity to consume the recipient’s
exports in both the donor and recipient nations. The theory of transfers and welfare shows
that if the marginal propensity to consume is identical in both nations, the price effect is
zero and positive income gains accrue to the recipient nation. If the recipient’s marginal
propensity to consume its exports is less than the donor’s marginal propensity to consume
these exports, then the aid induces a shift in the terms of trade against the recipient and in
favor of the donor. Under these circumstances, the price effect opposes the income effect.
On the other hand if the recipient’s marginal propensity to consume its exports is more
than the donor’s marginal propensity to consume these exports, the resulting shift in the
terms of trade reinforces the income effect.
The Keynes (1929) and Ohlin (1929) debate focused on whether international
transfers would produce unfavorable price effects that would result in a net reduction of
the recipient’s welfare. Samuelson (1947) showed that in a competitive, two-good, twocountry, and distortion- free general equilibrium model that assumes market stability, the
recipient gains and the donor loses from international transfers. Later contributions of
Bhagwati, Brecher and Hatta (1983), Kemp and Kojima (1985), Schweingerger (1990),
and Kemp (1995), among others, show that recipient impoverishment is possible if one
departs from the context of Samuelson (1947).
Departures from Samuelson (1947) arise if there are distortions or bystanders,
even in the presence of market stability. Gale (1974) extended Samuelson’s model and
considered three rather than two countries. Transfers take place between two countries
and the third country is simply a bystander (a non-participant in the transfer
arrangement). Gale (1974) showed that in this case, the price effect can dominate the
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income effect to cause a net reduction in the welfare of the recipient nation. This rather
paradoxical outcome is referred to as “the transfer problem” (Eaton, 1989; Jones and
Neary, 1984).
The intuition behind Gale (1974)’s result can be explained by looking at the price
effect. Note that the change in the terms of trade is determined only by the difference in
marginal propensity to consume between the recipient and donor.

The bystander’s

marginal propensity to consume has no effect on the terms of trade. Therefore, the
bystander can only gain or lose from any resulting changes in its terms of trade. The
improvement in the donor’s terms of trade can cause the bystander to react by raising its
price of exportable goods. As a result, the recipient of the transfer will now suffer a terms
of trade loss against both its trading partners. The price effect is therefore amplified and
can result in a net welfare loss.
In other contributions, it has been shown that the existence of distortions such as
trade taxes and non competitive prices can lead to a welfare paradox. Brecher and
Bhagwati (1982), show that in the two-good, two country model analyzed by Samuelson
(1947), production distortions due to trade taxes can cause transfers to immiserize the
recipient, even if markets are stable. To see why this is possible, let us assume that the
two goods under consideration are an import good and an export good. Suppose the
recipient imposes a tariff on imports. The deterioration in the terms of trade of the
recipient that accompanies a transfer from the other nation expands output of the
importable good in the recipient country. However, we know that this good was already
being overproduced as a result of the tariff. Thus the price effect compounds the existing

- 20 -

overproduction. As a result of this induced production distortion, the recipient nation can
suffer a net welfare loss.
Bhagwati, Brecher and Hatta (1983) analyze the effect of distortions in the two
good, three nation model in which one of the nations is a bystander. They find that
immerizing transfers cannot be ruled out even if stability conditions are satisfied.
Transfers that are subject to conditionality are another cause of the transfer paradox.
Using the same model as Samuelson (1947), Kemp (1995) showed that the tying of aid
may result in a transfer paradox even if markets are stable, undistorted and competitive.
To see why tied transfers can be immiserizing for the recipient, let us assume that
the transfer is given subject to the condition that the recipient must spend more on the
donor’s export good. If this conditionality causes the recipient to spend more on the
donor’s export than what the recipient would have spent in the absence of such
conditionality, the price effect favors the donor. Therefore if the price effect outweighs
the income effect, the recipient will experience a net welfare loss.
In Kemp (1995), the government’s forced expenditure pattern is responsible for
the welfare paradox. The analysis can be extended by adding a private sector to the
model. It then follows that if the government’s constrained expenditure pattern affects
the private sector’s expenditure pattern, a net welfare loss will occur for the recipient
nation. In fact this outcome is discussed in Schweinberger (1990).
There are other forms of conditionality. For example, transfers can be tied to a
specific project or policy. Helleiner (1992) points out that during the 1970s, the IMF
provided low conditionality transfers to developing countries. Similarly, the World Bank
also provided low conditionality transfers during this period in the form of project
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finance. However from the 1980s, both IMF and World Bank transfers became highly
conditional. The conditions placed on transfers by the multilateral agencies included
macroeconomic stability, price liberalization, privatization of loss making parastatals and
open trade regimes.
A crucial structural factor that has not been explicitly considered by the literature
in this area is that investment and production may be highly depended on imported
capital goods such as machinery and transport equipment. When analyzing the welfare
effects of transfers, we therefore have to recognize that for some countries, national
welfare is also affected by imported capital goods. The objective of this chapter is to take
into account capital goods imports in the welfare analysis of transfers. We build a twogood, two-nation general equilibrium model. Nation A is a developing country and
Nation B is a developed country. The import-competing sector of nation A uses foreign
capital from nation B. In addition, nation A receives transfers of financial resources or
capital from nation B.
Foreign financial transfers induce changes in commodity terms of trade, which in
turn affects capital inflows and the price of imported capital. Capital transfers are
associated with changes in the terms of trade, production and income. The welfare effect
of transfers is considered in the context of induced changes in these variables.
The export sector of nation A produces a primary commodity using labor and
land. An export tax is in place. We already know from Brecher and Bhagwati (1982)
that in the presence of trade taxes, transfers may be recipient immiserizing. Therefore,
we can expect a transfer paradox to be possible in this case. We show that endogenous
capital inflows induced by financial transfers may aggravate this transfer problem. When
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a transfer worsens the terms of trade, it expands the import competing sector. As in
Brecher and Bhagwati (1982), this leads to a misallocation of resources by contracting
trade further compared to the free trade outcome.4
In addition, expansion of the import competing sector raises the demand for
capital and its rate of return. Thus, more is paid to foreign capital and this is a terms of
trade loss in the factor market. In response to the higher return on capital, inflows occur,
further expanding the import competing sector. Thus, both the value effect (higher price
of imported capital) and the volume effect (greater inflow of capital) tend to reduce
welfare. If the transfer is tied to liberalization of trade, then if the existing export tax is
below its optimal level, an additional loss may be incurred.
We also show that changes in production and terms of trade that are caused by
capital transfers can lead to immiserzing growth. The presence of a trade distortion can
cause the price effect and production effect to overcome the income effect. As a result,
the recipient suffers a net welfare loss. The recipient’s welfare falls despite the fact that
productive capacity and hence growth has been increased by the transfer of capital.
The theoretical model and theoretical analysis are presented in section 2.2.

In

section 2.3, the model is solved numerically and used to simulate the effects of foreign
aid on welfare. The focus in sections 2.2 and 2.3 is on financial transfers. In section 2.4,
we discuss capital transfers, growth and welfare. The model of capital transfers, taxes and
welfare is analyzed in section 2.5. Section 2.6 presents the summary and conclusions.

4

In our model, an export tax is used. However, by virtue of the Lerner symmetry theorem, the export tax
has similar effects as an import tariff.
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2.2.

The model: financial transfers, taxes and endogenous capital flows
Let there be two nations A and B. A is a developing nation which produces two

goods 1 and 2, and B is a developed nation which also produces goods 1 and 2. Both
goods are produced using CRS technology. Good-1 is a primary commodity (like Cocoa)
and is produced using labor and land. Good-2 is a manufactured good produced using
labor and capital.

Nation A exports good-1 to nation B and imports good-2 from it.

Also, A imports physical capital from B for use in the import competing sector (i.e.,
good-2). Suppose B gives a transfer to A of an amount T. The effect of this transfer on
the terms of trade and the welfare of A is considered below. The expenditure-revenue
identities of the two nations are:5

A
A
A
A
I
A A
A I
E (p(1-t), 1, U ) = R {p (1-t), 1, K + K } + tp (R - E ) + T - R K .
1
1
3

B
B
B I
A I
(p, 1, U ) = R (p, 1, K -K ) - T + R K .
3

(2.1)

(2.2)

Capital is imported by nation-A from nation-B till their value of marginal product is
equalized:

A
A
I
B
B I
R {p(1-t), 1, K + K } = R (p, 1, K -K ).
3
3

(2.3)

The market clearing equation for good-1 is:
5

We will use the convention that for any function f(.), f (.) is the partial derivative of the function with
i
respect to the ith argument. Similarly, f (.) is the partial derivative of the function f (.) with respect to the jth
ij
i
argument.
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B
A
A
I
B
B I
A
A
B
E (p(1-t), 1, U ) + E (p, 1, U ) = R {p(1-t), 1, K + K } + R (p, 1, K -K ).
1
1
1
1

(2.4)

Equations (2.1) through (2.4) determine UA, UB, p and KI as functions of the export tax
rate t and the transfer level T. For simplicity, we solve the model recursively in the
following manner. Relations (2.1), (2.2) and (2.3) implicitly define (2.1a), (2.2a) and
(2.3a) below, respectively:

A
A
I
U = U (p, t, K , T).

(2.1a)

B
B
I
U = U (p, t, K , T).

(2.2a)

I
I
K = K (p, t).

(2.3a)

Using (2.1a), (2.2a) and (2.3a) in (2.4) we have:

A
A
B
B
E {p(1-t), 1, U (.)} + E {p, 1, U (.)}
1
1
A
A
I
B
B
I
= R {p(1-t), 1, K + K (.)}+ R {p, 1, K - K (.)}
1
1

(2.4a)

Relation-(2.4a) defines:

p = p(t, T).

(2.4b)
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From (2.4b) we obtain the terms of trade p as a function of the exogenous
variables t and T. Substituting for p and using the value of t, we obtain KI from (2.3a).
Finally, we can solve for UA and UB from (2.1a) and (2.2a), respectively.
We explore in some detail below the effect of different variables and parameters
in this model on the welfare of nation-A. This will be useful for a better understanding of
the analysis that will follow. Differentiating (2.1a) we have:

A
A
A
A
A I
dU = U dp + U dt + U dK + U dT.
3
4
1
2

(2.1b)

The first term on the right hand side of (2.1b) captures the terms of trade effect. In
addition to the standard gains from commodity terms of trade, the rise in price of the
export good leads to a reduction in the rate of return of capital in A, thereby reducing its
payments on foreign capital. Thus, the standard terms of trade effect is complemented by
an induced terms of trade effect on factor price of an imported input. To be precise:

A
A A
A
A
I A
A
A
A
A
U = [(R - E ) + tp(1-t) (R - E ) - K R (1-t)]/D >0; D = E + tpE > 0.
1
1
1
11 11
31
3
13

(2.1c)

The first term on the right hand side of the first equation in (2.1c) is the gain from
exporting the existing level of exports at a higher price. The second term measures the
gains in tax revenue from the expansion of exports. The last term is the gains from
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6
reduced price of capital imports (noting that the effect of p on RA
3 is negative).

The

direct effect of the tariff on UA (i.e., UA
2) is negative:

A
I A
A
A
A
U = p{tp(E - R ) + K R }/D <0.
2
11
11
31

(2.1d)

A rise in the export tax (for a given p) causes the usual production and consumption
distortions by reducing the domestic price of good-1 and also leads to a rise in the return
to capital. The latter compounds the costs of the tariff by raising the payments on foreign
capital. The direct effect of capital imports is measured by:

A
A
I A
A
U = (tpR - K R )/D .
3
31
33

(2.1e)

This effect has an ambiguous sign. A capital inflow will reduce the production of good1, aggravating the existing trade distortion. On the other hand, the fall in return on
capital reduces the payment on foreign capital and is welfare enhancing. Finally, the
direct effect of a transfer (for a given p, t and KI) is standard and is positive:

A
A
U = 1/D .
4

(2.1f)

Noting that p and KI are endogenous, we use (2.1b), (2.3a) and (2.4b) to obtain:
6

Note that good-1 is made by labor and land and good-2 by labor and capital. A rise in the price of good-1
will expand that sector and contract sector-2. The demand for capital will fall and so will its rate of return.
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A
A
A
A I
A
A I
dU = (αp + β)dt + (αp + U )dT, where, α = U + U K ; and, β = U + U K . (2.5)
1
2
4
1
3 1
2
3 2

2.2.1.

The transfer problem in the presence of an exogenous export tax and
endogenous capital inflows
Using the fact that t is exogenous (for the current analysis) and using (2.5), we

have:

A
A
A I
A
dU /dT = (U + U K )p + U .
1
3 1 2
4

(2.6)

The first term on the right hand side of (2.6) reflects the terms of trade effect of the
transfer. The change in terms of trade is:

A A
B B
B
B
p = { (E /D ) - (E /D )}/MLC; D = E ;
2
13
13
3

(2.7)

MLC is the slope of the global excess supply function and is positive to ensure stability.
We will assume that the marginal propensity to consume the primary commodity is
higher in B compared to A.7 This ensures that the numerator of (2.7) is negative, and
thus the terms of trade effect of the transfer is negative. Using (2.7) we can inspect (2.6)
and find that the sign of the welfare effect is ambiguous. The standard two-country
transfer problem has been compounded by two factors. First, an exogenous distortion in
the form of an export tax is present. Second, capital flows occur in response to the terms
7

This is fairly standard for primary product exporting nations. For example, cocoa producing nations
consume very little cocoa and the market lies mostly in developed nations. The literature in this area often
ignores the domestic consumption of the export good. In this case, the terms of trade effect in equation(2.7) is necessarily negative under normality in consumption.
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of trade change and this in turn affect welfare. To throw further light on this problem, we
reduce (2.6) to:

A
A
A
A
A I
I A
A
dU /dT = [{(Exp + θ )p + 1}/D ] + [U K – {K R (1-t)/D }] p .
1
2
3 1
31
2

(2.8)

The first term on the right hand side of (2.8) is the standard welfare effect of a transfer in
the presence of a fixed export tax.8 The second term is the effect of the endogenous
capital flows. The second term can be shown to be strictly negative. Thus, endogenous
capital flows aggravate the transfer problem that exists under trade taxation.
When A receives a transfer, its term of trade worsens (assuming p2<0). The fall
in p expands sector-2. More capital is needed, leading to a rise in the return to capital
(standard result in a specific factor context). Capital inflows occur, expanding the import
competing sector. There are three effects in the context of endogenous capital flows that
are worth explaining.9 First, the rise in the return to capital leads to a higher payment on
capital imports and this leads to a welfare loss. Second, the induced inflow of capital
reduces the return on capital and this leads to a rise in welfare. Finally, the inflow of
capital expands the protected sector, and this aggravates the trade distortion. The first
and the third effects dominate, and therefore the induced capital inflow is welfare
reducing.

8

Brecher and Bhagwati (1982) show that in the presence of import tariffs, transfers can be immiserizing if
they lead to an expansion of the protected sector. In a related context, Bandyopadhyay and Majumdar
(2003) explore the transfer problem in a three-country export taxation model and find a similar result.
I
9
The explanation relies on the last term in (2.8), relation-(2.1e) and the expression for K obtained from
1
(2.3a).
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2.2.2. The transfer problem in the context of trade liberalization tied to transfers
(i.e., dt/dT<0).
Often donor nations or agencies tie the provision of aid to liberalization of trade.
In our context, this implies that the export tax t is negatively related to the transfer T.
This sub-section briefly focuses on the transfer problem in that context. Using (2.5), we
have:

A
A
dU /dT = (αp + β)(dt/dT) + (αp + U ).
1
2
4

(2.9)

The first term on the right hand side reflects the standard welfare effect of a trade tax.
The term αp1 measures the terms of trade gain from a trade tax, while β measures the
efficiency loss from the trade tax. If the trade tax is optimally set, the term (αp1 + β) is
zero, and the effects of the transfer are as explored in the previous section. However, if
the tax is too low (relative to the optimal), then (αp1 + β) is positive, and trade
liberalization tied to transfers will aggravate the transfer problem. Therefore, depending
on how the existing export tax compares with the optimum, the tying of aid may worsen
or alleviate the transfer problem that we discuss in the previous sub-section.

2.3.

Model Simulations
To shed more light on the transfer problem in the context of trade liberalization

tied to transfers, we solve the model numerically and conduct simulations. We assume
specific functional forms in order to perform the simulations.
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2.3.1. Functional forms
Let us assume Cobb-Douglas production functions for the two goods and a CobbDouglas utility function for nation A. Therefore we have:

X1A = (L1A)a(K1A)1-a

(2.10)

X1B = (L1B)d(K1B)1-d

(2.11)

XN = (L2A)b(K2A)1-b

(2.12)

UA = (C1A)α(CNA)1-α

(2.13)

UB = (C1B) ϑ

(2.14)

The assumed utility functions give rise to the following expenditure functions:

EA [P1 (1-t), 1, UA] = (1-α) α-1 α-α [P1 (1-t)] α UA

(2.15)

EB = P1C1B

(2.16)

Given the assumption of Cobb-Douglas production functions, we get the following
revenue functions:
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− −
−
−
RA [P1 (1-t), 1, L A, K A+ KI] = L AB1s1B2s2[P1(1-t)]-s1+(K A+KI)B1s3B2s4[P1(1-t)]-s3

(2.17)

−
−
−
RB (P1, K B-KI) = P1 (L B)d (K B-KI)1-d

(2.18)

b-1
1-a
b
a
where s1 = a-b; s2 = a-b; s3 = a-b; s4 = - a-b

(2.19)

We assume the relation between tied aid and trade liberalization to be as follows:

tET = 1

(2.20)

2.3.2. Solution and simulation results
The functional forms allow us to solve the model to get explicit solutions and to
carry out simulation exercises. We specify the following parameter configurations:
−
−
−
−
α = 0.9, ϑ = 0.1, L A = 3000, L B = 1000, K A = 500, K B = 2000, a = 0.7, d = 0.2, b = 0.4,
B1= 0.4, B2 = 3.0 and T = 10.
Table 2.1 reports the results obtained when the model is solved using GAMS. The utility
level of nation A is 792.1402 and the values for the other endogenous variables are also
listed. QA is quantity of good 1 supplied by nation A, DA is quantity of good 1 demanded
by nation A, rA is the return to capital in nation A, rB is the return to capital in nation B,
and EX1A is nation A’s exports.
We now simulate the effects of tied aid by considering the effects of a marginal
increase in T from T = 10 to T = 10.1. Table 2.2 reports the simulation results. The
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results indicate that nation A suffers a utility loss following an increase in aid that is tied
to trade liberalization. The utility level of nation A is now 792.0902. Terms of trade
have declined as shown by the fall in the price of good 1 from 0.59292090 to
0.59249898. Since nation A has suffered a net welfare loss, we can conclude that the
price effect dominates the income effect. As a result of the unfavorable terms of trade
shift, exports respond weakly to the tax incentives, as suggested in table 2.2. The results
also suggest that the non-traded sector benefits from tied aid through increased capital
inflows. This further hurts the traded sector through a reallocation of labor.
In order to verify that tied aid is the cause of welfare loss in nation A, we
considered the case of untied aid. We chose a parameter value for t equal to 0.1 in order
to get the same results reported in table 2.1. We then proceeded to simulate the effects of
untied aid by considering the effects of a marginal increase in T from T = 10 to T = 10.1.
Table 2.3 reports the simulation results.
As suggested by theory, we see that when aid is untied, nation A benefits because
the income effect dominates the price effect. Thus we have established that starting from
the same level of utilities, untied aid increases the welfare of the recipient, while tied aid
has a perverse welfare effect. We can therefore conclude that the tying of aid is
responsible for the welfare loss in nation A, given the functional forms and parameter
values chosen.

2. 4.

Capital transfers, growth and welfare
So far we have discussed the transfer of financial resources. In this section we

consider the transfer of foreign capital. As before, foreign capital expands the productive
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capacity of the import-competing sector. The import-competing sector will therefore
produce more goods. It is interesting to find out how this induced economic growth from
a capital transfer affects national welfare. This issue is important because it raises the
possibility of immiserizing growth.
We will first illustrate immiserizing growth and then see if such immiserization
can occur as a result of capital transfers. Let us modify the model on financial transfers,
taxes and endogenous capital flows by dropping export taxes, financial transfers and
capital flows. Using the same approach to solve the model, it can be shown that the
terms of trade now depend on the capital endowment:

p = p (KA)

(2.21)

The effect of the of the capital endowment on the terms of trade can be found by using
the implicit function theorem on the market clearing equation for good 1:

dp/dKA = {(R1VA – mpc1RVA)/MLC}; VA= KA

(2.22)

MLC is the slope of the excess demand function and is negative to ensure stability. The
term mpc1 is nation A’s marginal propensity to consume good 1. Suppose in this case,
good 1 is the import good. Let us also assume that good 1 is labor intensive and good 2 is
capital intensive (the export good). Suppose nation A experiences a growth in capital.
From the Rybczynski theorem, we know that:
R1VA < 0

(2.23)
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The implication of (2.23) is that a rise in capital reduces the supply of good1 in nation A
at given world prices. Therefore:

dp/dKA {(R1VA – mpc1RVA)/MLC}>0

(2.22a)

Using the implicit function theorem on the budget constraint for nation A, we can find the
effect of a change in the capital endowment of nation A on the welfare of nation A:

EUA dUA/dVA = -M1/MLC[R1VA + RVA (n1+n2-1)/p]

(2.24)

where:

M1 = R1A-E1A < 0

(2.24a)

The expression (2.24) contains the compensated excess supply elasticity which is given
by n1 and is positive. In (2.24), we also have the foreign import demand, which is given
by n2. Therefore if foreign import demand is inelastic (n2 <1), we have:

dUA/dVA ≤ 0

(2.24a)

From (2.24) and (2.24a), it can be seen that growth is export biased (R1VA < 0) and
welfare reducing. In other words, growth is immiserizing.
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2.5.

The model: capital transfers, taxes and welfare
For simplicity, we will assume that all the income generated by the foreign capital

accrues to the recipient and is not repatriated. Furthermore, since we a dealing with a
factor transfer, we ignore factor price equalization. We use the same notation as in
section 2.2, and ignore financial transfers. The expenditure-revenue identities of the two
nations are:

A
A
A
A
I
A A
E (p(1-t), 1, U ) = R {p (1-t), 1, K + K } + tp (R - E )
1
1

(2.25)

B
B
B
B I
E (p, 1, U ) = R (p, 1, K -K )

(2.26)

The market clearing equation for good-1 is:

B
A
A
I
B
B I
A
A
B
E (p(1-t), 1, U ) + E (p, 1, U ) = R {p(1-t), 1, K + K } + R (p, 1, K -K ).
1
1
1
1

(2.27)

Equations (2.25) through (2.27) determine UA, UB and p as functions of the export tax
I
rate t and the capital transfer K . As before, we solve the model recursively in the

following manner. Relations (2.25) and (2.26) implicitly define (2.25a) and (2.26a)
below, respectively:

A
A
I
U = U (p, t, K ).

(2.25a)

B
B
I
U = U (p, K ).

(2.26a)
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Using (2.25a) and (2.26a) we have:

B
A
A
B
E {p(1-t), 1, U (.)} + E {p, 1, U (.)}
1
1
A
A
I
B
B
I
= R {p(1-t), 1, K + K }+ R {p, 1, K - K }
1
1

(2.27a)

Relation-(2.27a) defines:

p = p(t, KI ).

(2.27b)

From (2.27b) we obtain the terms of trade p as a function of the exogenous
variables t and KI. Substituting for p and using the values of t andKI, we can solve for
UA and UB from (2.25a) and (2.26a), respectively.
Differentiating (2.25a) we have:

A I
A
A
A
dU = U dp + U dt + U dK
1
2
3

(2.25b)

The first term on the right hand side of (2.25b) captures the terms of trade effect. Using
the implicit function theorem on (2.25), we can obtain an explicit expression of the terms
of trade effect:

A
A
A
A
A
A A
A
A
U = [(R - E ) + tp(1-t) (R - E )]/D >0; D = E + tpE > 0.
1
1
1
11 11
3
13
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(2.25c)

The first term on the right hand side of the first equation in (2.25c) is the gain from
exporting the existing level of exports at a higher price. The second term measures the
gains in tax revenue from the expansion of exports.
The second term on the right hand side of (2.25b) measures the partial effect of
the tariff on the welfare of nation A. Using the implicit function theorem on (2.25), this
effect can be expressed as follows:

A
A
A
A
U = p{tp(E - R ) }/D <0.
2
11
11

(2.25d)

A rise in the export tax (for a given p) causes the usual production and consumption
distortions by reducing the domestic price of good-1. Similarly, the direct effect of capital
transfers on the welfare of nation A is measured by:

A
A
A
A
U = (tpR + R )/D .
3
31
3

(2.25e)

This effect has an ambiguous sign. A capital transfer will reduce the production of good1. On the other hand, the return on capital is positive. It should be noted that if the export
tax is zero, the direct effect of the capital transfer on welfare is positive. The presence of
an export tax means that production of exports as well as consumption is distorted.
Capital transfers add to these distortions by further contracting the export sector. As a
result welfare is also further reduced.

Totally differentiating (2.27b) we have:
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dp = p1dt + p2 d KI

(2.27c)

The direct effect of capital transfers on the terms of trade (p2) can be obtained from
(2.27a) and is given by:
B
A
A A
B B
B B
B
p = {R - R
2
13
13 + E13 U 3 + E13 U 2}/MLC <0; U 2= - R 3 / E 3 < 0.

(2.27d)

MLC is the slope of the global excess supply function and is positive to ensure stability.
In the absence of a trade tax, the sign of p2 is negative if the donor’s marginal propensity
to consume good1 is higher than the recipient’s marginal propensity to consume good 1
(see for example, Brakeman and van Marrewijk, 1998). With an export tax, the negative
A > RA in absolute
effect of capital transfers on the terms of trade is only possible if tpR31
3
terms.

From Brecher and Bhagwati (1982), we know that in a two good, two country

model with market stability, a transfer in the presence of a production distortion leads to a
A > RA in absolute value.
terms of trade distortion. Therefore tpR31
3
Substituting (2.27c) into (2.25b) and simplifying we get:
A
A
A
A
A
A
A I
dU = (U p + U )dt + {U p + (tpR
1 1
2
1 2
31 + R 3 )/D }dK

(2.25c)

From (2.25c), the effect of capital transfers on welfare is given by:
A A A A
A I
A
dU /dK = U p + tpR / D + R /D
1 2
31
3

(2.28)
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From (2.28), it can be seen that capital transfers have a price effect, a production effect
and an income effect. The first term on the right hand side of (2.28) is the price effect,
the second term is the production effect and the last term is the income effect. Under free
trade, welfare depends on the price effect and the income effect alone. We know from
Samuleson (1947) that in this case, the income effect dominates the price effect and
welfare improves as a result. With the trade distortion in (2.28), we know from Brecher
and Bhagwati (1982) and Bandyopadhyay and Majumdar (2003) that the price effect and
production effect overcome the income effect and the recipient suffers a net welfare loss.
The recipient’s welfare falls despite the fact that productive capacity and hence growth
has been increased by the transfer of capital. Growth is therefore immiserizing.

2.6.

Summary and conclusions
Many developing countries are highly dependent on foreign capital goods that are

used in the import competing industrialized sector. The exporting sector focuses on
primary products where land and labor are predominantly used. We build a two-good
general equilibrium model, where the import competing sector uses foreign capital input.
The model is used to theoretically analyze how financial transfers and capital transfers to
a developing country affect the welfare of the developing country. In addition, we also
analyze the welfare effect of foreign aid using simulations.
In the case of financial transfers, we find that such transfers induce changes in
commodity terms of trade, which in turn affects capital inflows and the price of imported
capital. If export taxes are taken to be exogenous, we find that endogenous capital flows
aggravate the transfer problem that exists under trade taxation. When trade liberalization
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is tied to transfers, we find that the tying of aid may worsen or alleviate the transfer
problem, depending on how the existing export tax compares with the optimum. To shed
more light on the transfer problem in the context of trade liberalization tied to transfers,
we solve the model numerically and conduct simulations. We find that the tying of aid
results in a welfare loss for nation A, given the functional forms and parameter values
used in carrying out the simulations.
In the case of capital transfers, we find that such transfers affect welfare through a
price effect, a production effect and an income effect. The presence of a trade distortion
causes the price effect and production effect to overcome the income effect. As a result,
the recipient suffers a net welfare loss. The recipient’s welfare falls despite the fact that
productive capacity and hence growth has been increased by the transfer of capital.
Growth is therefore immiserizing.
In conclusion, transfer paradoxes cannot be ruled out in the context of capital
goods. If there is a trade distortion, untied transfers reduce welfare through a value effect
(higher price of imported capital) and a volume effect (greater inflow of capital). Both the
value effect and the volume effect are induced by the price effect of the transfer. The
tying of financial transfers can also lead to a welfare loss. Capital transfers may reduce
welfare by causing immiserizing growth.
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Table 2.1: model solution
Variable

Solution

t
UA
P1
P1(1-t)
KI
C1A
QA
DA
rA
rB
EX1A

0.1
7.921402E+2
0.59292090
0.53362881
6.269433E+2
1.742571E+3
1.061184E+3
6.073102E+2
0.44519375
0.44519375
4.538737E+2

Table 2.2: simulation results with tied aid
Variable

Solution

t
UA
UB
P1
P1(1-t)
KI
C1A
QA
DA
rA
rB
EX1A

0.09900990
7.920902E+2
2.10919618
0.59249898
0.53383571
6.283700E+2
1.742488E+3
1.062779E+3
6.079165E+2
0.44496945
0.44496945
4.548623E+2
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Table 2.3: simulation results with untied aid
Variable

Solution

UA
UB
P1
P1(1-t)
KI
C1A
QA
DA
rA
rB
EX1A

7.922209E+2
2.10918620
0.59291899
0.53362709
6.269942E+2
1.742405E+3
1.061119E+3
6.073724E+2
0.44519561
0.44519561
4.537468E+2
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CHAPTER 3

Transfers, Trade Taxes and Endogenous Capital Flows: An Empirical Analysis of
Sub-Saharan Africa

3.1.

Introduction

Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is a region with 48 countries and had a total population of 688
million people in 2002.10 Most countries in Africa are located in this region. Exceptions
are north African countries (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia) which are
considered to be part of the Middle East. 11 The 48 countries are:
Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central
African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Dem. Rep., Congo, Rep., Côte d'Ivoire,
Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,
Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mayotte
Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, São Tomé and Principe, Senegal,
Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo
Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
Real GDP per capita in 2000 was US$ 564, which places the majority of countries in the
low income category. Exceptions are Namibia and South Africa which are classified as
lower middle income economies and Botswana, Mauritius and Seychelles which are
classified as upper middle income economies. The agricultural sector is the main sector
of most economies. According to Helleiner (1994) and Sender (1999), about 65-70% of
the population depends on the agricultural sector for employment and survival. The
sector is also a major source of foreign exchange earnings. It contributes over 50% of
total exports (Sender, 1999).

10

The data profile for SSA described in this section was obtained from World Development Indicators
(2003).
11
A map of the political geography of Africa can be found in appendix I.
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Due to the fact that agriculture is the primary economic activity, the other sectors
of the economy have backward and forward linkages with the agricultural sector.
Exports of the region consist mainly of undiversified primary products. Given the
importance of agriculture, most of these exports are agricultural products. West African
countries such as Cameroon, Cote d’ Ivoire, Ghana, and Nigeria are major exporters of
cocoa. Cote d’ Ivoire is also a major exporter of coffee, while Kenya is a major exporter
of tea. Other important agricultural exports include cotton, tobacco and groundnuts.
As a consequence of colonialism, SSA has many small countries. Collier and
Gunning (1999) estimate that SSA’s population is approximately half that of India and is
divided among the 48 states.

The existence of such small economies implies that

opportunities for realizing economies of scale and scope are very much limited.
Consequently the region has to import capital goods and inputs necessary for
development from abroad.
Since the 1980s, multilateral resource flows to Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) have
become the most important source of external finance that supports policy reforms. The
objective of these policy reforms is to achieve sustained growth in per capita income that
would provide the welfare gains needed to lift Africa out of poverty. Over and above
supporting reforms, these transfers are by themselves an important source of income and
hence welfare. From 1970 to 1980, SSA’s average GDP per capita growth was 1.23%,
from 1980 to 1990, GDP per capita growth decelerated to -0.78%, and from 1990 to
2000, GDP per capita growth was -0.52%.12
On the other hand, total EDA to SSA was US$23.7 from 1978 to 1981. It fell
slightly to US$22.5 from 1982 to 1985, and then rose to reach US$30.7 from 1986 to
12

Author’s calculations based on data from World Development Indicators (2002).
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1989 before reaching a peak of US$37.3 from 1990 to 1993. Thereafter it declined
slightly to US$ 32.3 from 1994 to 1997.13 Given these large transfers after 1980, one
would expect to see positive welfare gains in SSA. How can we reconcile the economic
stagnation with increased transfers? In order to understand the rationale for multilateral
transfers and reforms in SSA and to evaluate their impact on welfare, it is useful to
analyze the economic performance of the region in the period prior to the reforms and
transfers and in the period after reforms and transfers.

3.1.1. Sub-Saharan’s economic performance prior to reforms
Before 1970, SSA’s enjoyed good economic performance. Based on Collier and
Gunning (1999), SSA grew faster than Asia during the 1950s. The high growth was
sustained in the 1960s, as the region increasingly became free of colonialism. However,
starting from the 1970s, SSA experienced a decline in growth and is yet to recover from
this economic decline.
A number of factors have accounted for SSA’s economic stagnation between
1970 and 1980. Based on Ndulu (1991) and Wheeler (1984), these factors can be
grouped under policy misdirection and exogenous factors. Key among the exogenous
factors is terms of trade, weather and world interest rates. Exports are the major
component of GDP in monocultural economies such as those in Zambia, Nigeria, Gabon,
Congo, Mauritius and Ethiopia. The performance of exports is heavily influenced by the
terms of trade, which are exogenous. Commodity terms of trade declined during this
period because the demand for SSA exports was weakened by global recessions. The
poor export performance adversely affected growth.
13

The source of EDA data is Chang, Fernandez-Arias, and Serven (1998).
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In response to the weak export performance, many countries had to rely on
external resources to meet import requirements. The increase in real interest rates on
external debt during this period resulted in a diversion of resources from financing
investment requirements to debt servicing. Shifting weather conditions have negatively
affected growth because the region has many agro-based economies.
Policy misdirection was in the form of import allocation policy and anti-trade
policies. According to Wheeler (1984), the trade regimes of SSA were characterized by
trade barriers such as import quotas, import licensing, prohibitive tariffs and export taxes.
While the trade regimes were suited to the goal of import substitution and raising
revenue, they however discouraged exports. The combined effects of anti-export policies
and the decline in terms of trade led to a balance of payments crisis. Most of the
governments in SSA responded to the balance of payments crisis with an import
compression policy. Imports of consumer goods were restricted and first priority was
given to imports of capital goods followed by imports of intermediate goods. This import
allocation policy is consistent with country studies for Tanzania by Ndulu (1986) and
Zimbabwe by Davies (1991). Wheeler (1984) and Ndulu (1991) document the existence
of an import allocation policy for the rest of the region.
The import allocation policy led to capacity expansion through increased
investment. However, Ndulu (1991) notes that the new capacity was underutilized
because it heavily depended on imported intermediate goods which were rationed. In
addition, Ndulu (1991) also points out that the problem of capacity utilization was
worsened by the lack of complementary investments in infrastructure and human capital.
As a result, the import allocation policy was not effective in generating economic growth.
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The World Bank (1989) underscores the importance of expansionary monetary and fiscal
policies as well as overvalued exchange rates as sources of economic stagnation during
this period.

3.1.2. Sub-Saharan Africa’s economic performance in the reform period
During the 1980s, many countries in SSA realized that policy reforms were
necessary for economic recovery. As a result, SSA embraced IMF and World Bank
economic reforms. Highly concessional transfers were provided by the World Bank’s
International Development Association (IDA) to finance the reforms. To enable the
transfers and reforms to improve welfare, IDA emphasizes the following: 14
a) Accelerating broad-based growth through sound macroeconomic and sectoral
policies, especially for rural and private sector development.
b) Investing in people through strong support for the social sectors, including
gender mainstreaming and efforts to counter the challenge and social impact
of communicable diseases, especially HIV/AIDS.
c) Building capacity for improving governance - including in public expenditure
management - and combating corruption.
d) Protecting the environment for sustainable development.
e) Fostering recovery in post-conflict countries.
f) Promoting trade and regional integration.

14

This list of items is taken from the World Bank website. For a list of EDA borrowers in SSA, see
appendix II.
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Concessional lending under the IMF is done under the Poverty Reduction and Growth
Facility (PRGF), formerly known as the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility
(ESAF). Article I of the IMF agreement summarizes the objectives of IMF concessioanl
lending:15
a) To facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international trade, and to
contribute thereby to the promotion and maintenance of high levels of
employment and real income and to the development of the productive resources
of all members as primary objectives of economic policy.
b) To promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange arrangements
among members, and to avoid competitive exchange depreciation.
c) To assist in the establishment of a multilateral system of payments in respect of
current transactions between members and in the elimination of foreign exchange
restrictions which hamper the growth of world trade.
d) To give confidence to members by making the general resources of the Fund
temporarily available to them under adequate safeguards, thus providing them
with opportunity to correct maladjustments in their balance of payments without
resorting to measures destructive of national or international prosperity.
e) In accordance with the above, to shorten the duration and lessen the degree of
disequilibrium in the international balances of payments of members.
It is quite clear therefore that the policy reforms advocated by the IMF and World Bank
consist of stabilization measures and adjustment measures. Stabilization measures include

15

The listed items were obtained from the IMF website. For a list of countries in SSA that are eligible for
PRGF, see appendix II.
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devaluation and complementary monetary and fiscal policies, while adjustment measures
include resource mobilization, institutional reform and market liberalization.
According to Helleiner (1994), the economic reforms which were implemented in
the 1980s were as follows:
(1) major currency devaluations;
(2) major real cuts and reorientation towards agriculture in the government budget;
(3) reorientation of public expenditures in the productive sectors

towards

rehabilitation and maintenance;
(4) increased taxes on consumer goods;
(5) raising nominal wages by significantly less than what is required to make up for
the effects of inflation;
(6) liberalization of the import regime;
(7) substantially raising nominal producer prices for agricultural cash crops so as at
least to limit real declines;
(8) reduced price controls;
(9) increased competition and flexibility in agricultural marketing; and
10) privatization of government-owned assets and concentrated efforts to raise
efficiency in remaining governmental institutions.
It is now more than two decades since SSA embarked on economic reforms. During this
period, the region has also received disproportionate amounts of multilateral transfers.
The outcome of the transfers as well as the reforms in terms of progress towards restoring
growth in per capita income is however disappointing. Africa remains the poorest
continent in the world. Transfers and reforms have simply not delivered the expected
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welfare outcomes. That the standard of living is generally very poor is quite evident from
the per capita income levels, which have grown much slower compared to the rest of the
world.
Several factors have been put forward to explain the poor economic performance
after 1980. Some of the exogenous factors continued to play an important role. Recurring
droughts have reduced the output of a predominantly agricultural region. Deteriorating
terms of trade have also been persistent. As Yeats (1997) put it:

..in 1962-64 copper alloys were the region’s single largest commodity export,
with Sub-Saharan Africa supplying 32 percent of all OECD imports. By 1991-93,
however, Africa’s market share had dropped more than 22 percentage points to
less than 10 percent. Similarly, Africa’s market shares for other key commodities
(such as vegetable oils, palm oil, palm nuts and Kernels, and groundnuts) dropped
47-80 percentage points below earlier levels. For the thirty most important non-oil
exports combined, Africa’s average shares declined by more than 11 percentage
points (from 20.8 percent to 9.7 percent), which implies annual trade losses of
about $11 billion… (Yeats, 1997, 1).
Exports and hence growth suffered as a result. Interestingly enough, the implementation
of economic reforms in the 1980s is also blamed for the poor growth. According to
Helleiner (1994), the major problems in the economic reforms were:
(i) over-reliance upon reform in incentive structures;
(ii) relative neglect of the provision of crucial public goods, especially in agricultural
infrastructure;
(iii) naiveté about the nature of required changes in the financial system, particularly the
efficacy of interest rate increases;
(iv) naiveté about the efficacy of privatization, especially in agricultural marketing and
input distribution;
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(v) neglect of human capital and poverty;
(vi) over-optimism over the prospects for expansion of earnings from traditional exports;
(vii) under-funding, and inappropriate forms of external assistance; and
(viii) inadequate appreciation of the fiscal implication of reform packages incorporating
sharp devaluations and interest rate increases.
Stiglitz (1998), Ndulu (1994), and Fischer and Corbo (1995) also discuss some of these
factors.
The World Bank (1989) distinguishes between countries with strong reforms and
countries with weak reforms. The following countries were classified as strong reformers:

Guinea-Bissau, Niger, Ghana, Madagascar, Zaire, Gambia, Mauritania, Senegal,
Tanzania, Cote d’voire, Burundi, Congo, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, Togo, Guinea,
Mauritius.
Countries classified as weak reformers were as follows:
Angola, Benin, Burkina, Cape Verde, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea,
Ethiopia, Liberia, Mali, Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe, Seria Leone, Somalia,
Sudan, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Helleiner (1994) compares the GDP growth of the strong reformers and the weak
reformers. The data does not show that strong reformers outperformed weak reformers as
one would expect. This finding lends supports to Helleiner (1994)’s observation that
there were major problems related to the reforms themselves.
There are of course other factors that could have caused SSA’s lack of economic
progress. There has been a plethora of empirical studies on this subject. Empirical studies
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that look at the welfare performance of SSA have taken two different approaches. Some
studies have sought to explain cross-national differences in welfare while other studies
analyze factors that explain the welfare of SSA as a region. Both approaches use per
capita income as the measure of welfare. Studies that have followed the first approach
include Rodrik (1998), Easterly and Levine (1997) and Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997).
The second approach has been followed by the IMF (1996) and the World Bank (1981,
1994).
Based on available cross-national data for the whole world, Easterly and Levine
(1997) explain why per capita income has remained much lower in SSA compared to the
rest of the world. The reasons are low schooling, political instability, underdeveloped
financial systems, distorted foreign exchange markets, high government deficits and poor
infrastructure. Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997) also use a global data set, but reach a
different conclusion. They argue that trade policies, geography and demography explain
why per capita income in SSA has remained low at a time when the rest of the world is
enjoying much higher per capita incomes. The combination of closed trade policies, a
tropical climate (characterized by poor health, poor soils and unreliable rainfall patterns),
many landlocked countries and high population growth is seen to have adversely affected
the wellbeing of SSA.
Rodrik (1998) has analyzed variation in per capita income within SSA. According
to his findings, the most important factors accounting for differentials in per capita
income are: human resources (life expectancy), macro/fiscal policy (public savings),
demography (changes in the dependency ratio), export policies (export taxes) and a
catch-up/convergence factor (initial per-capita income). The IMF (1996) and the World
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Bank (1981, 1994) view policy mistakes as the key explanation for SSA’s failure to
grow.

3.1.3. Objectives
The fact that policy reforms in SSA seek to create competitive markets and get rid
of distortions (among other things) means that until such reform initiatives have been
successfully implemented, multilateral transfers may not be able to improve welfare since
the Samuelsonian conditions are not met. In addition, the fact that multilateral aid is often
tied to policy reform measures such as liberalization, stabilization and privatization raises
the possibility of recipient impoverishment based on the arguments advanced by Kemp
and Kojima (1985) and others. Could these be some of the reasons why SSA has still not
seen growth in per capita income despite more than two decades of reforms (since the
1980s)?16 Our paper addresses this question.
A crucial structural factor that affects the performance of SSA that has not been
explicitly considered by the literature on the transfer problem is that investment and
production are highly depended on imported capital goods such as machinery and
transport equipment. Country studies by Wangwe (1983), Green and Kadhani (1986),
and Davies and Rattso (1993) report a high degree of import dependency. A Sub-Saharawide study by Ndulu (1991) also finds a high degree of import dependency. Moran
(1989) shows that dependency on imports of capital goods is a general characteristic of
16

The World Bank (2001) study on aid and reform in SSA classifies ten countries into four groups:
successful reformers, post-socialist reformers, mixed reformers and non-reformers. Table 3.1 shows that
most of the aid was given to the successful reformers, post-socialist reformers, and mixed reformers. It also
shows that with the exception of Uganda, GDP per capita did not improve for other countries in these three
groups just as it did not improve for the non-reforming countries. Group categories therefore do not tell us
much about economic performance. Different starting points of reform and hence different durations of
reforms (see Table 3.1) could be important in explaining differences in GDP per capita growth.
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poor developing countries. The study by Ndulu (1991) finds that the ratio of capital
goods imports to investment for the whole of SSA has been stable around 36%. This
translates to very high ratios at the country level. For example, Green and Kadhani (1986)
find that the ratio of capital goods imports to investment ranges between 65-75% for the
manufacturing sector in Zimbabwe.
We build an econometric model and empirically analyze the transfer problem in
the presence of an exogenous export tax and endogenous capital inflows. The empirical
analysis borrows from the general equilibrium model developed in chapter 2, some of the
existing literature discussed above and from Savvides (1995) and Barro (2000) who
emphasize the importance of factors such as openness and inflation in contributing to the
weak performance of SSA nations.
The empirical model and discussions related to data are presented in section 3.2.
Estimation results are presented in section 3.3. Section 3.4 presents the summary and
conclusions.

3.2.

Model specification and data description17
The transfer problem in the presence of an exogenous export tax and endogenous

capital inflows is analyzed empirically by estimating relations (2.1a), (2.3a) and (2.4b).
Based on these relations, we can specify the following equations:
I
UA = a0 + a1p + a2t + a3K + a4T + e1

(3.1)

KI = b0 + b1p + b2t + e2

(3.2)

17

It is important to note that due to data problems we use import tariffs rather than export taxes in the
empirical analysis. However, by virtue of the Lerner symmetry theorem, there is no harm in treating them
similarly, because a reduction of an export tax or an import tariff has analogous effects on prices, trade
volumes and welfare.
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p = c0 + c1t + c2T + e3

(3.3)

UA is measured by the change in real GDP of nation-A. We were unable to obtain data on
imports of capital goods. However, we know from Ndulu (1991) that the ratio between
real imports of capital goods and real investment for SSA was stable around 36% over
the 1980s decade. Based on this ratio and using data on real gross capital formation
(GCF) for real investment, we calculated real imports of capital goods (KI). Since our
data set covers mostly the 1980s, estimated data on real capital goods imports should be
close to the actual data. Foreign investment is calculated as the change in real imports of
capital goods (∆KI).
We measure p using the terms of trade. This is because the terms of trade is the
relative price of exports and is given by the ratio of the export price index to the
corresponding import price index. T is real aid disbursed by the multilateral institutions.
It is based on the World Bank (1998)’s new approach to measuring aid flows called
Effective Development Assistance (EDA). EDA is an aggregate measure of aid flows
combining total grants and the grant equivalents of all official loans.18 The GDP deflator
was used to calculate real disbursements of multilateral EDA. Data on other exogenous
variables that affect the model are used to carry out robustness checks. Variables used for
the robustness checks are openness (open), growth and inflation (inf). Openness is
measured by trade as a percent of GDP and it affects p and UA. Inflation also affects

18

For more details about EDA, see Charles C. Chang, Eduardo Fernandez-Arias, and Luis Serven (1998).
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UA.19 The variable growth refers to GDP per capita growth (annual %) and it affects ∆KI.
In addition, we use real imports as one of the instrumental variables.
Average tariff rates (unweighted) were obtained from the World Bank’s
International Trade and Development dataset. Data on multilateral aid is from Chang,
Fernandez-Arias, and Serven (1998). The rest of the data were obtained from the World
Bank’s Global Development Network Growth dataset and World Development
Indicators’ (2002). Data is available for 14 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa for the
period 1980-1995.20 Rodrik (1998), Helleiner (1994) and Ghai (1987) suggest that there
are important idiosyncratic or country specific factors as well as aggregate factors that
affect income in SSA. To account for this heterogeneity across countries and through
time, we use a two-factor model for panel data. We assume fixed effects. The two-way
or two-factor model with fixed effects can be estimated by OLS.

The estimation

procedure creates dummy variables that capture the fixed effects. We use instrumental
variables to avoid the problem of endogeneity bias. In the theoretical model presented in
section-2, T is assumed to be exogenous. This assumption does not hold empirically as
shown by Frey and Schneider (1986).

In the estimation, T lagged is used as an

instrument for T. Terms of trade and real capital goods imports are endogenous in the
model. Lagged terms of trade are used as an instrument for terms of trade and real
imports are used as an instrument for real capital goods imports.

19

In the literature, it has been shown that inflation and openness affect growth (see for example Savvides
(1995), Rodrik (1998), and Barro (2000)). We therefore expect these variables to also affect changes in
real GDP.
20
The countries are: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Madagascar,
Mauritius, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
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3.3.

Model estimation and results
Table 3.2 reports the results obtained for equation (3.3). Foreign aid causes a

significant reduction in the terms of trade as predicted by theory. The results also show
that tariffs significantly reduce the terms of trade. This is because tariffs increase the
price of imports relative to the price of exports. The instrument used in the estimation
(T-lagged) has the desirable properties: it is highly correlated with T (the correlation
between T and T lagged is 0.71) and uncorrelated with the residuals (the correlation
between T lagged and residuals is -0.12.). Results for equation (3.2) are shown in
table 3.3. The terms of trade are significant and negatively affect capital inflows as
predicted by the theoretical model. Tariffs have a positive effect on capital inflows. The
reason is that higher tariffs encourage domestic production of importable goods. Since
production of importables requires foreign capital, there is an increased inflow of foreign
capital goods to expand production of the importable goods. The effect of tariffs on
capital inflows is however insignificant.
We use terms of trade lagged as an instrument in the estimation. The correlation
between terms of trade lagged and terms of trade is 0.89 and the correlation between
terms of trade lagged and the residuals is 0. Terms of trade lagged are therefore a good
instrument to use. Table 3.4 reports the results for equation (3.1). An improvement in
terms of trade raises welfare, but is not significant. Liberalizing trade by reducing tariffs
has a negative effect on welfare as expected. The effect is however insignificant. Inflows
of foreign capital are significant and they reduce welfare as predicted by the theoretical
model. Finally, foreign aid has a positive effect on welfare as expected. This is the
positive income effect of a transfer. The income effect is however not significant. In the
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estimation, real imports are used as an instrument for foreign capital. For terms of trade
and foreign aid, the instruments are as before. The correlation between real imports and
foreign capital is 0.68 and the correlation between real imports and residuals is 0. Real
imports are therefore a good instrument to use and so are the other two instruments. The
correlation between terms of trade lagged and residuals is 0 and the correlation between
aid lagged and residuals is 0.01.
Robustness checks are performed by adding other exogenous variables to the
model, testing for multicollinearity and analyzing the effect of dropping some countries
from the analysis. Equations (3.1) to (3.3) are augmented as follows:21
UA = a0 + a1p + a2t + a3KI + a4T + a5open + a6inf + e1

(3.1a)

KI = b0 + b1p + b2t + b3growth + e2

(3.2a)

p = c0 + c1t + c2T + c3open + e3

(3.3a)

The same procedure is used to estimate equations (3.1a) to (3.3a). Table 3.2a reports the
results for equation (3.3a). The results are robust. Increased openness significantly
reduces terms of trade. The reason is that our sample consists of small open economies
specializing in primary commodity exports which have generally experienced
deteriorating terms of trade.22
Results for equation (3.2a) are shown in table 3.3a. The effects of terms of trade
and tariffs on capital inflows are robust. Growth is significant and is positively related to
21

Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997) show (using a dummy variable) that countries with access to the sea
perform better than landlocked countries. Savvides (1995) shows that political freedom (measured by
indices of political rights and civil liberties) also affects the performance of SSA. In unreported regressions,
we find these factors to be insignificant. This could be due to the fact that we do not estimate a growth
regression like the other studies. We also experimented with colonialism (measured as the number of years
under colonialism) but this was not significant as well.
22
See for example Ndulu (1991) and Wheeler (1984).
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capital inflows. This is because higher growth tends to attract more investment. Finally,
the results for equation (3.1a) are shown in table 3.4a. The results are robust and have
improved in terms of significance. Terms of trade are now significant. Both openness and
inflation are significant. Greater openness improves welfare as expected.23 Inflation hurts
welfare by creating an unstable macroeconomic environment. The correlation matrices
of exogenous variables for the different estimations show that multicollinearity is not a
problem. According to the World Bank (2001), Uganda’s growth has been stronger than
other reforming SSA countries. We exclude it from the sample and find that the results
are robust. Excluding larger countries like Nigeria also does not overturn the results. It
does not appear therefore that certain countries are driving the results.24
To sum up, our empirical results show that multilateral transfers
significantly reduce terms of trade. The reduction in terms of trade significantly induces
foreign capital inflows. Increased capital inflows and terms of trade deterioration
significantly offset the real GDP gains from multilateral transfers.

The results are

consistent with the theoretical analysis in chapter 2 and are robust.

3.4.

Summary and conclusions
The poor performance of Sub-Saharan Africa has been attributed to bad luck

caused by exogenous factors and policy misdirection. Attempts at structural
transformation through stabilization and adjustment programs has not led to economic
recovery. Inflows of multilateral transfers into the region have also not delivered the
expected welfare outcomes. A number of explanations have been offered to explain why
23

See for example, Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997).
The results for multicollinearity checks and sensitivity to country selection are not reported, but are
available upon request.

24
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SSA has failed to grow and thereby enhance its welfare despite implementing reforms
and receiving external financial support. None of these explanations have analyzed
transfers and welfare in the context of imported capital goods.
SSA is highly dependent on imported capital goods that are used in the import
competing industrialized sector. The exporting sector focuses on primary products where
land and labor are predominantly used. We build an econometric model and empirically
analyze the transfer problem in the presence of an exogenous export tax and endogenous
capital inflows. This is done by estimating a regression model with fixed effects for a
panel of 14 countries in SSA. Our empirical results show that multilateral transfers
significantly reduce terms of trade. The reduction in terms of trade significantly induces
foreign capital inflows. Increased capital inflows and terms of trade deterioration
significantly offset the real GDP gains from multilateral transfers.

The results are

consistent with the theoretical analysis in chapter 2 and are robust.
To conclude, our results suggest that an additional factor may be relevant in
explaining why SSA’s welfare failed to improve. In the presence of capital imports, the
price effect leads to a volume effect (greater inflow of capital). Both the price effect and
the volume effect offset the income effect. Consequently overall welfare will fall if the
income effect is dominated by the other two effects.
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Table 3.1: Aid Per Capita (U.S. dollars) and GDP Per Capita Growth (%) for Selected
Countries in SSA, 1982-97

Successful Reformers
Aid per capita
Ghana
Uganda
GDP per capita growth
Ghana
Uganda
Post-Socialist Reformers
Aid per capita
Ethiopia
Mali
Tanzania
GDP per capita growth
Ethiopia
Mali
Tanzania
Mixed Reformers
Aid per capita
Cote d’Ivoire
Kenya
Zambia
GDP per capita growth
Cote d’Ivoire
Kenya
Zambia
Non-Reformers
Aid per capita
DR Congo
Nigeria
GDP per capita growth
DR Congo
Nigeria

Start of
Reform

1982-85

1986-89

1990-93

1994-97

1983
1987

12.2
13.6

34.3
22.0

35.2
35.4

31.4
26.3

1983
1987

-2.79
-1.22

1.41
1.91

1.12
2.43

1.82
4.66

1991

10.3
32.1
26.9

16.0
46.7
39.8

19.9
46.0
39.3

15.1
47.4
29.6

-1.41
-0.89

0.73
-0.78

-0.06
-1.23
-0.40

0.84
1.80
0.40

1981
1980
1983

11.7
28.4
37.4

21.6
30.2
54.1

36.8
34.5
82.0

74.2
24.5
111.7

1981
1980
1983

-4.11
-1.32
-3.87

-1.83
2.59
-0.83

-3.66
-1.51
-1.83

2.28
0.74
-2.90

Not started
Not started

9.4
0.7

15.0
1.4

8.9
2.1

4.9
1.4

Not started
Not started

-1.36
-3.23

-1.65
1.72

-12.74
1.56

-5.63
-0.50

1986
1991
1986

Source: Data on aid per capita is from World Bank (2001).
GDP per capita growth figures are from World Development Indicators, World
Bank (2002).
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Table 3.2: Equation (3.3) with two-way fixed effects
(Dependent variable = terms of trade (p))
Explanatory Variable
Estimated
Significance Level
Coefficient
Real aid (T)
-9.873
.0000
(-4.923 )
Import tariffs (t)
-1.427
.0042
(-2.894)
constant
150.264
.0000
(12.505)
Adjusted R-squared = 0.48
t-statistics are in parentheses.

Table 3.3: Equation (3.2) with two-way fixed effects
(Dependent variable = foreign investment (∆KI))
Explanatory
Variable
Terms of trade (p)
Import tariffs (t)
constant

Estimated
Coefficient
-1.010
(-4.461)
.810
(.471)
89.670
(1.630)

Significance Level
.0000
.6381
.1045

Adjusted R-squared = 0.07
t-statistics are in parentheses.
Table 3.4: Equation (3.1) with two-way fixed effects
(Dependent variable = ∆GDP)
Explanatory
Estimated
Significance Level
Variable
Coefficient
Terms of trade (p)
1.377
.2319
(1.199)
Import tariffs (t)
-.896E-01
.9881
(-.015)
I
-.129
.0000
Foreign capital (K )
(-8.067)
Real aid (T)
22.076
.3997
(.844 )
.2527
constant
244.914
(1.147)
Adjusted R-squared = 0.38
t-statistics are in parentheses.
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Table 3.2a: Equation (3.3a) with two-way fixed effects
(Dependent variable =terms of trade( p))
Explanatory Variable
Estimated
Significance Level
Coefficient
Real aid (T)
-8.400
.0001
(-4.106)
Import tariffs (t)
-1.342
.0062
(-2.762)
openness
-.489
.0072
(2.713)
constant
172.360
.0000
(12.010)
Adjusted R-squared = 0.50
t-statistics are in parentheses.

Table 3.3a: Equation (3.2a) with two-way fixed effects
(Dependent variable =foreign investment(∆KI))
Explanatory
Variable
Terms of trade (p)
Import tariffs (t)
growth
constant

Estimated
Coefficient
-.973
(-4.328)
.910
(.558)
5.986
(3.558)
83.109
(1.583)

Significance Level
.0000
.5776
.0005
.1148

Adjusted R-squared = 0.18
t-statistics are in parentheses.
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Table 3.4a: Equation (3.1a) with two-way fixed effects
(Dependent variable = ∆GDP)
Explanatory
Estimated
Significance Level
Variable
Coefficient
Terms of trade (p)
2.531
.0339
(2.135)
Import tariffs (t)
.687
.9076
(.116)
I
-.140
.0000
Foreign capital (K )
(-8.682)
Real aid (T)
8.599
.7482
(.321)
openness
7.000
.0035
(2.955)
Inflation
-1.966
0585
(-1.902)
constant
-214.329
.4116
(-.823)
Adjusted R-squared = 0.40
t-statistics are in parentheses.
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CHAPTER 4

4.

Trade Liberalization, Underemployment and Welfare: Is there a Conflict?

4.1.

Introduction
Underemployment or labor under-utilization is a problem that exists in all

economies. In developing countries where the problem affects the majority of the
population, low unemployment rates can be misleading indicators of economic
performance.

The problem of underemployment is reflected by two labor market

phenomenon. Firstly, its presence can be observed when there are individuals who
engage in economic activities which do not suit their skill level. Secondly,
underemployment is present when the hours of work for an individual are not enough and
the individual is willing to engage in alternative forms of employment that have more
hours of work.
Therefore underemployment can be either skill related or time related. The ILO
uses the time related measure of underemployment.

According to the ILO (2002),

persons in time related underemployment must satisfy the following three criteria;25
(1) willingness to work additional hours;
(2) available to work additional hours; and
(3) worked less than a threshold relating to working time.
Willingness to work additional hours implies that an individual wanted another job in
addition to their current job to increase their total hours of work; to replace any of their
current jobs with another job with increased hours of work; to increase the hours of work

25

Definitions of these criteria are taken from the ILO (2002).
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in any of their current jobs; or a combination of the above. It should be noted that
individuals who have actively sought to work additional hours are distinguished from
those who have not.
Available to work additional hours means that an individual is ready, within a
specified subsequent period, to work additional hours, given opportunities for additional
work. Worked less than a threshold relating to working time means that a person whose
hours actually worked in all jobs during the reference period, was below a threshold.
This threshold may be determined by the boundary between full-time and part-time
employment, median values, averages, or norms for hours of work as specified in
relevant legislation, collective agreements, and agreements on working time arrangement
or labor practices in countries.
These two forms of underemployment are interrelated. Both represent low levels
of productivity relative to what would be obtained under alternative employment
situations. The presence of either form of underemployment is of concern for economic
and social reasons. From an efficiency point of view, the fact that part of the labor force
is underutilized reduces welfare as will be shown later. In fact, economic development
does not make sense if it does not provide people with the opportunity to be productively
employed and thereby raise their welfare. Socially, underemployment is undesirable
because it implies low earnings among the affected individuals which lead to poor living
standards. In developing countries, this problem is reflected in low life expectancy and
the high incidence of health and social maladies.
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Existing literature on the effects of trade liberalization reforms in developing
countries has focused on unemployment or employment but not on underemployment.
Harrison and Hanson (1999) discuss the small impact that trade liberalization has had on
employment in developing countries. They regard this small employment response as a
puzzle because trade liberalization is expected to result in a large reallocation of
employment from import-competing sectors to labor intensive export oriented sectors of
the economy.
Studies done on Mexico and Morocco find that trade reform in the 1980s had very
little effect on employment. Revenga (1997) for example finds that the reduction in
Mexican tariffs and quotas did not cause the anticipated employment changes. Her
estimates show that tariff reductions had no effect on employment at all. Quota
reductions were significant, but caused a very small effect: she reports that a reduction in
quotas by 80% resulted in a 2 to 3 % fall in employment. Currie and Hanson (1997)
analyzed the effect of trade reform in Morocco. They find that in most sectors,
employment was not affected by lowering tariffs and quotas.
In a review of the empirical literature on trade orientation, liberalization and
unemployment, Edwards (1993) highlights the importance attached to the effect of trade
reform on short-term employment and long-run employment. The NBER study by
Krueger (1983) analyzes the linkages between trade policy and employment in 10
developing countries. The study focused on measuring the labor intensity of the export
sector and the import competing sector. It also measured the contribution of protection in
causing a shift towards the capital intensive import-competing sector. Krueger (1983)
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concludes that trade liberalization would lead to increased employment as labor migrates
to the labor intensive export sector.
Multilateral lending institutions emphasize trade liberalization in order to deal
with the unemployment/employment problem in developing countries. For example,
World Bank studies by Balassa (1982), Michaely et al (1991) and the IMF (1993) analyze
the consequences of trade liberalization on employment or unemployment.
The widespread focus on trade liberalization and unemployment or employment
while important does not, in isolation, shed light on the wider problem of inadequate use
of a nation’s human resources. If underemployment is very high, then employment per se
is not the issue, and in such a case it is not surprising to get a weak employment response.
This is not to deny that other factors such as adjustment costs are important. Our point is
that underemployment is so pervasive in developing countries that it does not make sense
to look at employment in isolation.
In the context of a small open economy, underemployment is not a problem if real
wages are flexible and labor is homogeneous and inter-sectorally mobile. Under these
conditions, the real product wage in the export sector is expected to fall relative to the
real product wage in the import-competing sector following the liberalization of trade by
reducing trade taxes. As a result, the export sector will expand relative to the importcompeting sector. These changes will decrease employment in the import-competing
sector and increase employment in the export sector.26
Since the labor market is assigned a central role during trade liberalization, it is
useful to analyze the structure and functioning of labor markets in a small open economy.
26

The expansion of the export sector relative to the import-competing sector under trade liberalization is
justified on the grounds that it improves welfare by removing production and consumption distortions that
are caused by trade taxes (see for example, Krugman and Obstfeld, 2003).
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Based on Agenor (1996), there are three main sectors in the labor market; a rural sector,
an informal urban sector and a formal urban sector. The rural sector is made up of selfemployed persons and unpaid family workers. Self employed persons are also in the
informal sector. They include small traders, taxi drivers, street vendors (and so on) as
well as privately owned small businesses producing services and non-tradable goods.
Although this sector relies mostly on family labor, it occasionally relies on paid labor.
Employees have no formal contracts and benefits, job insecurity is high and labor
productivity is low. Wages are flexible and the sector is not unionized. Government
regulations are not enforced in this sector and low productivity gives rise to
underemployment.
In contrast, the formal sector consists of medium and large enterprises which
produce both tradables and non-tradables. It employs both skilled and unskilled labor.
Employees have formal contracts and government regulations require employers to
provide benefits such as pensions, health insurance, and job security to employees.
Wages are determined on the basis of productivity, collective bargaining, or government
regulations such as minimum and maximum wage policies.
The labor market institutions and regulations have important implications for the
functioning of labor markets. Hiring and firing regulations protect workers in the formal
sector and make it difficult for employers to lay off workers. Non-wage labor costs add to
this labor market rigidity. In addition, minimum wage laws, trade unions and productivity
considerations affect the flexibility of wages.
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The problem of low labor absorption in many developing countries was the result
of policies which were biased towards development of the formal sector alone.
According to Mhone (2000), the main policy biases were as follows:
(a) Regulatory policies that gave the legal advantage to large firms in the formal
sector with respect to accessing finance and various government benefits such as
subsidies, export markets and services, including the regulation of prices and
markets;
(b) Government expenditure policies that effectively subsidized large capital
intensive firms;
(c) Various implicit and explicit subsidies that cheapened the relative cost of capital
through skewed tariff and customs policies, credit provision, foreign exchange
policies, education and training policies, research and development policies,
provision of utilities, transport infrastructure, storage facilities, and so on; and
(d) Labor market outcomes which reinforced the tendency toward capital intensity,
either as a consequence of union action or government regulation.
These policies therefore benefited the formal sector and acted against the other two
sectors. The outcome of the policies had important implications for labor absorption.
Based on Mhone (2000), some of these outcomes were as follows:
(1) The tendency towards low employment elasticity with respect to output and
investment. In some developing countries in SSA, these elasticity are less than
one percent. Given that GDP growth rates in SSA are less than five percent and
population growth rates are about three percent per annum, the nature of the labor
absorption problem is very evident.
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(2) The tendency toward excess capacity given the shortfall in aggregate demand.
(3) The fact that small scale firms and micro-enterprises had to override
insurmountable barriers to be successful, and often with very little support from
the government. In addition, given the limited labor absorption rates in the formal
sector, the non-formal sector tends to be the employer of last resort for survival.
Importance in this respect is the lateral expansion that results from ease of entry
in the informal sector, which tends to depress labor returns. Also, informal sector
enterprises attempting to engage in productive activities have to contend with a
cost disadvantage since, unlike firms in the formal sector, they lack access to
discount facilities with respect to finance, inputs, and markets.
(4) The absence of employment opportunities in the formal sector and saturation in
informal sector activities led to low income and low productivity in the informal
sector as reflected by long hours of work and very low wages.
These outcomes help to explain why underemployment is so pervasive and is a serious
problem in developing countries.
The functioning of labor markets in developing countries has important
implications for trade reforms. As noted by Forteza and Rama (2001):

“But if real wages cannot be cut…the reallocation process would take much
longer than with a flexible labor market, and it could be associated with high
unemployment or under-employment (p.2).”
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In addition, the labor market institutions and relocation costs may prevent instantaneous
inter-sectoral labor mobility. As discussed above, labor is not homogeneous. A typical
small open economy is characterized by an export sector that is intensive in the use of
unskilled labor and an import-competing sector that is intensive in the use of skilled
labor.27 Furthermore, the export sector is more labor intensive and the import-competing
sector is more capital intensive. Also, real wages are not fully flexible as discussed
above. Akerlof and Yellen (1986) observe that in general most markets seem to clear, but
not the labor market. Real wages generally seem to be rigid.
We present a general equilibrium trade model that explicitly takes into account
the employment structure and wage inflexibility of a typical small open economy. The
model has two sectors; a labor-intensive export sector and a capital-intensive importcompeting sector. Real wages are assumed to be flexible in the export sector and rigid in
the import-competing sector. The rigidity of real wages in the import-competing sector is
endogenously determined on the basis of the efficiency wage hypothesis.28 Efficiency
wage studies such as Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), Foster and Wan (1984), Akerlof (1982)
and Weiss (1980) provide strong evidence that real wage rigidity can be explained by
endogenous factors. Real wage rigidity in the skilled sector results in underemployment.
The model is used to analyze the effect of trade liberalization on underemployment and
welfare.
Our analysis shows that liberalizing trade by reducing export taxes results in
sectoral shifts that increase underemployment. The effect on welfare is ambiguous. In

27

These features of a small open economy are based on Knight (1976) and Krueger (1983).
Based on Akerlof and Yellen (1986), the efficiency wage hypothesis argues that firms care about labor
productivity which is a function of the real wage paid. Firms may therefore find it profitable to keep wages
above equilibrium in the presence of involuntary unemployment.

28
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fact, free trade is not optimal: we find that a small export tax leads to a welfare
improvement. We complement the theoretical analysis with an empirical analysis of the
effect of trade liberalization on underemployment. This is done by estimating a
regression model with fixed effects for a panel of 19 developing economies. The
empirical results show that trade liberalization significantly reduces employment in the
skilled sector. Robustness checks give the same result. The result provides indirect
evidence that trade liberalization increases underemployment as explained by the
theoretical model.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 discusses in detail the
theoretical model and theoretical analysis. The model specification and data used are
discussed in section 4.3. Section 4.4 explains model estimation and empirical results.
Concluding remarks are given in Section 4.5.

4.2.

The Model: export taxes, underemployment and welfare
Assume a small open economy that produces and consumes two goods, 1 and 2,

and is a net exporter of good 1 and a net importer of good 2. Both goods are produced
u
using CRS technology. Good 1 is produced in sector A using unskilled labor (L ) and
s
sector specific land (Z), and good 2 is produced in sector B using skilled labor (L ) and
sector specific capital (K).

Skilled and unskilled workers are perfect substitutes in

sector A. There is no substitution between skilled and unskilled workers in sector B. The
2
amount of output produced by the import-competing sector (X ) depends on the effort
(e) of skilled workers. In order to get the required level of effort, the import-competing
s
sector pays an efficiency wage (w ) to skilled workers employed. Output produced by
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1
the export sector (X ) does not depend on a stipulated level of effort from unskilled
u
workers and the unskilled wage rate (w ) is competitively determined. An exogenous
export tax is in place. Let t be the export tax rate employed and let p* be the relative
world price of good 1.
The world price of good 2 is normalized to one. Equations (4.1) and (4.2) describe
the production functions for goods 1 and 2 respectively:
1
1 u
X = X (L , Z)

(4.1)

2
2
s
X = X (eL , K)

(4.2)

In order to determine the skilled wage rate, we assume for simplicity that the utility
function for all workers is separable. The utility function is given by

U (w, e) = v(w) + β(e), v′>0, v″<0, β′<0

(4.3)

where w is the wage rate, e = ē >0 when employed in sector B and not shirking, e = ê
when shirking while employed in sector B, or when working in the export sector, and
ē>ê. Let π be the probability that a skilled worker is caught shirking at the beginning of
the period, in which case he or she gets fired and must work as an unskilled worker in the
export sector. For a skilled worker to provide effort, the expected utility from working
must at least be equal to the expected utility from shirking:

u
s
s
v(w ) + β(ē) ≥ π(v(w ) + β(ê) ) + (1- π) (v(w ) + β(ê) )
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(4.4)

Condition (4.4) holds with equality when skilled workers are indifferent between shirking
and not shirking. Let us assume that this is the case and that skilled workers choose not to
shirk. We can then solve (4.4) to get the skilled wage:
s
u
β(ê)- β(ē)
v(w ) = v(w ) +
π

(4.5)

(4.5) implicitly defines:
u
s
s
w = w ( ē, w )

From (4.3), β(ê)- β(ē)>0.

(4.5a)

s
Therefore equation (4.5) implies that w is set above its

u
opportunity cost (w ). The basic proposition of the efficiency wage hypothesis is that
employers offer an above equilibrium wage rate to get the required level of effort. We
s
proceed below to show that w is above the equilibrium wage rate. Firms in both sectors
maximize profits. Equations (4.6) and (4.7) describe profit determination in sectors A and
B respectively:
u
1 u
u u u
π = p*(1-t) X (L , Z) - w L - r Z

(4.6)

s
2
s
s s s
π = X ( ē L , K) - w L - r K

(4.7)

From (4.6) and (4.7), the first order conditions for profit maximization with respect to the
choice of labor yield:

p*(1-t)

∂X

1

∂L

u
u
u (L , Z) = w

(4.8)
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∂X

2

∂L

s
s
(ē
L
,
K)
ē
=
w
s

(4.9)

(4.8) and (4.9) implicitly define:

u
u
u
L = L (p*(1-t), Z, w )

(4.8a)

s
s
s
L = L ( ē, K, w )

(4.9a)

−u
−s
Let L and L be the available pool of unskilled and skilled workers. Suppose the export

sector employs only unskilled labor. Equation (4.8) can then be solved for the market*
clearing unskilled wage rate (w ) to yield:
u
1
*
−u
∂X
w = p*(1-t)
(L , Z)
u
u
∂L

(4.8b)

If the skilled labor market is allowed to clear, equation (4.9) can be solved for the market*
clearing skilled wage (w ) to yield:
s
2
* ∂X
−s
w =
(ēL , K) ē
s
s ∂L

(4.9b)

There are two possible labor market outcomes, (i) and (ii) as discussed below:

- 77 -

*
*
β(ê)- β(ē)
(i) v(w ) ≥ v(w ) +
π
s
u

*
*
β(ê)- β(ē)
(ii) v(w ) < v(w ) +
π
s
u

For the first outcome, no efficiency wage is required. The incentive is to work in
s
*
sector B. The second outcome implies that at w = w , there is no incentive at all to
s
work in sector B. Faced with this scenario, it follows that skilled workers will be
attracted to sector B only if the following labor market outcome obtains:

s
*
β(ê)- β(ē)
(iii) v(w ) ≥ v(w ) +
π
u

s
*
s
*
(ii) and (iii) imply that v(w ) > v (w ) and thus w > w , which shows that in
s
s
equilibrium, the efficiency wage rate is set above the market-clearing wage rate. As a
result, there is underemployment since the rationing of jobs in the import-competing
sector means that part of the skilled labor force is forced to work as unskilled labor in the
u
*
export sector. The increased labor supply in the export sector means w < w .
u
s
*
*
u
Consequently final equilibrium is such that w > w > w > w (see (4.5) and (iii)) and
s
u
demand-supply equalization in the unskilled labor market is characterized by condition
(4.10) below:
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u
u
−u −s s
s
u
L (p*(1- t), w ) = L + L - L ( w ( ē , w ))

(4.10)

(4.10) implicitly defines:

u
u
w = w (p*(1-t), ē)

(4.10a)

If all wages were flexible, there would be no underemployment of skilled workers and
trade liberalization would unambiguously improve welfare. The flexibility of both skilled
and unskilled real wages would lead to efficient labor markets and the following
expenditure-revenue identity: 29
−u −s
E(p*(1-t), 1, U) = R(p*(1-t), 1, L , L ) + tp*(R - E )
1 1

(4.11)

Differentiating (4.11), we have:
−u
−s
E dU = R dL + R dL – t(p*)2 (R - E ) dt
11 11
u
3
4

(4.11a)

Concavity of the revenue function implies that R11 >0, convexity of the expenditure
function implies that E11 <0 and E >0. Therefore the effect of an export tax reduction
u
on welfare is negative as shown in (4.11b).

dU
2
dt = - (1/ Eu ) t(p*) (R11 - E11 ) < 0

(4.11b)

29

We summarize the main results. Detailed derivations can be found in the attached technical appendix.
We will sometimes use the convention that for any function f, fi is the partial derivative of f with respect to
the ith argument. Similarly fij is the partial derivative of the function fi with respect to the jth argument.
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Thus, trade liberalization improves welfare. The elimination of distortionary tax effects
and efficiency gains from labor market flexibility lead to the welfare improvement. In
the model with efficiency wages, two propositions can be derived.

Proposition 1:
Given the structure of employment described above, trade liberalization in the presence
of endogenous underemployment leads to higher underemployment.
Proof and comments:
Assume that (i) and (ii) are satisfied so that there is some preexisting endogenous
underemployment in the economy.
Totally differentiating (4.9a) and using (4.5a) and (4.10a):
s
∂L
s
d L = γ dē +
dK + δ dP

(4.12a)

∂K

Where:
s

γ =

δ =

s

s

u

s

∂L
∂w
∂w
∂w
∂L
+
+
)
u
s (
∂ē
∂ē
∂ē
∂L

s

s
∂w

∂w

∂w

s

u

∂w

∂w

(4.12b)

∂w
u ∂P <0

(4.12c)

P = p* (1-t)

(4.12d)
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Using relation (4.12a), the effect of trade liberalization on the demand for skilled labor is
given by:
s
dP
dL
d t = δ dt >0

(4.12e)

From (4.12e), a reduction in trade taxes reduces the demand for skilled workers in the
import-competing sector. This is caused by sectoral adjustments as the economy shifts
from import-competing production to export-oriented production. The export sector will
therefore absorb skilled workers who are unable to find jobs in the import-competing
sector and this gives rise to greater underemployment.

Proposition 2:
Trade liberalization has an ambiguous effect on welfare in the presence of endogenous
underemployment. Free trade is not optimal and a small export tax leads to a welfare
improvement.
Proof and comments:
Assume (i) and (ii) are satisfied so that endogenous underemployment exits. Labor
allocation is not efficient and balanced international trade implies:
1
2
E(p*(1-t), 1, UA) = p*X + X - tp*E

(4.13)

1

Totally differentiating (4.13) yields:

(E

1
2
2
+ tp*E ) dU = p*d X + d X + t(p*) E dt
u
1u
11
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(4.13a)

Using (4.1), (4.2), (4.8), (4.9), and (4.10), the change in total revenue can be expressed as
follows:
s
s
1
2
1
w +tw
p*d X + d X = p*(1)dX ,
u
w

s
s
w +tw
>1
u
w

(4.14)

Using (4.13a) and (4.14) we have:

s
s
1
2
dU
w +tw dX
ψ dt = p*(1) dt + t(p*) E
u
11
w

(4.15)

ψ=E

(4.15a)

u

+ tp*E >0
1u

The effect of an export tax reduction on sector-1 can be shown to be negative:

u
1
w
dX
dt = p*(1-t)

u
s
s
s
u
(∂L /∂t ) (∂ L /∂ w )(∂ w /∂ w )
u
u
s
s
s
u <0
∂L /∂ w + (∂L /∂ w )(∂ w /∂ w )

(4.15b)

dU
(4.14), (4.15a) and (4.15b) imply that dt has an ambiguous sign. Therefore trade
liberalization has an ambiguous effect on welfare. There are two reasons why this is the
case. First, the decrease in consumption and production distortions that occurs when the
export tax is reduced improves welfare. Second, part of the skilled labor force is allocated
to the unskilled sector and is therefore underemployed. This underutilization of some
skilled workers represents an inefficient outcome which leads to a welfare loss. As a
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result, the net effect on welfare is unclear. However, if the effect of trade liberalization on
welfare is evaluated at t = 0, the result is unambiguous as shown below:

s
s
1
w +tw dX
dU
) dt >0
u
dt t = 0 = (1/Eu ) p*(1w

(4.15c)

This suggests that a small departure from free trade leads to a welfare improvement. At
t = 0, all trade distortions have been eliminated. However a production distortion induced
by efficiency wages is still present. A small tax corrects this efficiency wage distortion
by expanding sector B relative to sector A. As sector B expands, it draws labor from
sector A and this leads to a fall in underemployment. Welfare increases as a result of the
efficiency gains from improved labor allocation. There is thus an optimal export tax (t*)
dU
that maximizes welfare. The optimal tax is where ψ dt = 0, which can be obtained from
(4.15):
s
1
s
1
w
dX
w dX
t* = - [(1- u ) dt ] /[ u dt + p*E ] >0
11
w
w

(4.16)

Thus, partial trade liberalization is optimal for a small open economy with
underemployment.

4.3.

Model specification and data description
Proposition 1 can be analyzed empirically using relation (4.9a). Based on this

relation, we can specify the following equation:
s
s
L = α 0 + α 1 ē + α 2 K + α 3 w + u1

(4.17)
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Using relations (4.5a) and (4.10a), we can specify the following equations:
u
s
w = β 0 + β 1 ē + β 2 w + u2

(4.18)

u
w = θ 0 + θ 1p* + θ 2 t + θ 3 ē + u3

(4.19)

Substituting (4.18) and (4.19) into (4.17) we get the following reduced form equation for
skilled labor demand:
s
L = λ 0 + λ 1 ē + λ 2 K + λ 3 p* + λ 4 t + u4
The expected effects of ē, p* and K on L

(4.20)
s

can be analyzed using relation (4.12a).

s
Differentiating L with respect to ē yields:
s

dL
dē = γ

(4.20a)

Relation (4.20a) has an ambiguous sign. However, since productivity is the basis upon
s

which labor is hired, we expect the partial effect of ē on L to dominate, so that overall
s

dL
s
dē has a positive sign. Differentiating L with respect to p* yields:
s

dL
dp* = δ (1-t) <0

(4.20b)

Relation (4.20b) implies that an improvement in the terms of trade reduces the demand
for skilled labor. This is the expected result. An improvement in the terms of trade
expands the export sector. As the export sector expands, labor is reallocated from the
s

import-competing sector to the export sector. Differentiating L with respect to K yields:
s

s

dL
∂L
=
>0
dK
∂K

(4.20c)
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As expected, relation (4.20c) shows that a rise in the capital stock increases demand for
skilled employment. We already know from proposition 1 that trade liberalization is
expected to reduce the demand for skilled workers.
Employment in the industrial sector as a percent of total employment is used to
measure the skilled workforce. Value added per person employed in the manufacturing
sector measures labor productivity. Export prices are measured using the terms of trade.
Trade taxes are measured using average tariff rates (t).30 Gross capital formation (GCF)
as a percent of GDP is used to measure K. Data on industry employment and labor
productivity were obtained from the ILO-Key Indicators of the Labor Market (2002).
Terms of trade data are from the World Bank’s Global Development Network Growth
Dataset and average tariff rates were obtained from the World Bank’s International Trade
and Development dataset. Data on gross capita formation was obtained from the World
Bank’s World Development Indicators (2002).
Additional data on government final consumption expenditure as a percent of
GDP (gov) and secondary school gross enrollment ratios (sch) were also obtained from
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (2002) and are used to carry out
robustness checks. As in Savvides (1995), we use secondary school enrollment ratios as
a measure of investment in human capital and government consumption expenditure as a
measure of fiscal policy. Policy misdirection is one of the reasons why developing
countries have experienced poor economic performance.

We therefore expect the

variable gov to be negatively related with skilled employment. Investment in human
capital is expected to raise the skill level and thereby increase employment opportunities.

30

Data on export taxes was unavailable. However, by virtue of the Lerner symmetry we know that export
taxes and tariffs have analogous effects.
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The variable sch should therefore be positively related with skilled employment. Data for
all the variables is available for 19 developing economies for the period 1990-1999.31

4.4.

Model estimation and empirical results
Equation (4.20) is estimated by OLS in non-linear form (using logs) for the 19

countries.

32

To account for country effects, panel data estimation with one-way fixed

effects is used.33 It is possible that tariffs may be influenced by employment. To avoid
the problem of endogeneity bias, we use lagged t as an instrument for t. The correlation
between t and t lagged is 0.99 and the correlation between t lagged and the residuals is
0.29. These correlations suggest that t lagged has the desirable properties of a good
instrument. The results of the estimation are reported in table 4.1. An increase in
productivity leads to higher skilled employment as expected. The result is significant. A
rise in the capital stock increases demand for skilled employment. The result is however
not significant. Terms of trade improvements significantly increase skilled employment.
This result differs from what the model predicts. A reduction in tariffs causes a
significant decline in skilled employment as predicted by the theoretical analysis.
Two robustness checks are conducted. We check whether the results are robust to
the addition of other exogenous variables. In addition, we also check whether the results
are robust to country selection. We augment equation (4.20) by adding gov and sch :
s
L = λ 0 + λ 1 ē + λ 2 K + λ 3 p* + λ 4 t + λ 5 gov + λ 6 sch + u5

31

(4.21)

The developing countries are China, Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Phillipines, Singapore, Thailand, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru,
and Venezuela.
32
We use logs because of non-linear dependencies in the data.
33
With such a short sample for each country, the one-way fixed effects model is more reliable than the twoway fixed effects model.
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Non-linear estimation of equation (4.21) yields the results reported in table 4.2. The
results are robust and significant. A sound fiscal policy significantly contributes to higher
skilled employment as expected. Increasing investment in human capital raises skilled
employment as expected. The correlation matrix of exogenous variables is shown in
table 4.3. The correlation structure shows that multicollinarity is not a problem. Finally
we check the sensitivity of the results to country selection. We find that excluding any
one country from the estimation does not overturn the results.34
To summarize, the empirical results show that reducing import tariffs causes a
significant decrease in skilled employment. This result does not change when different
robustness checks are conducted. In the context of the theoretical model, the skilled
workers who have lost their jobs in the skilled sector will be reallocated to the unskilled
sector where they will be underemployment. Viewed from the perspective of the
theoretical model, the empirical results lend strong support to proposition 1.35
4.5.

Summary and conclusions
The chapter develops a two sector general equilibrium model that explicitly takes

into account the employment structure and wage inflexibility of a typical small open
economy. Real wage rigidity in the skilled sector results in underemployment. The model
is used to analyze how trade liberalization affects underemployment and welfare. We find
that liberalizing trade by reducing export taxes expands the unskilled sector and contracts
the skilled sector. These sectoral shifts lead to greater underemployment.
Our results also show that liberalizing trade by reducing export taxes has an
ambiguous effect on welfare due to the presence of endogenous underemployment. In
34
35

The results for sensitivity to country selection are not reported, but are available upon request.
The direct effect of trade liberalization on underemployment could not be estimated due to lack of data.
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fact, free trade is not optimal: we find that a small export tax leads to a welfare
improvement. The reason is that a small tax reduces underemployment by expanding the
skilled sector relative to the unskilled sector. Welfare increases as a result of the
efficiency gains from improved labor allocation.
We complement the theoretical analysis with an empirical analysis of the effect of
trade liberalization on underemployment. This is done by estimating a regression model
with fixed effects for a panel of 19 developing economies. The empirical results show
that trade liberalization significantly reduces employment in the skilled sector as
predicted by the theoretical model. Robustness checks give the same result. This result
provides indirect evidence that trade liberalization increases underemployment as
explained by the theoretical model.
The analysis leads us to conclude that there is a conflict between trade
liberalization, underemployment and welfare.

This conflict arises from a failure to

address the structure and functioning of labor markets in small open economies.
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Table 4.1: Estimation results
s
(Dependent variable = skilled labor demand (L ))
Explanatory Variable

Coefficient

P-value

Labor productivity (ē)

.126

.0469

(2.002)
Capital stock (K)

.455E-01

.2814

(1.081)
Terms of trade (p*)

.475

.0000

(6.622)
Import tariffs (t)

.941E-01

.0022

(3.106)

t-statistics in parenthesis.
Table 4.2: Estimation results with additional exogenous variables
s
(Dependent variable = skilled labor demand (L ))
Explanatory Variable
Labor productivity (ē)

Estimated Coefficient
.170

P-value
.0248

(2.270)
Capital stock (K)

.920E-01

.1586

(1.418)
Terms of trade (p*)

.299

.0038

(2.946)
Import tariffs (t)

.119

.0009

(3.410)
Fiscal policy (gov)

-.107

.0077

(-2.706)
Human capital investment (sch)

.156
(2.359)

t-statistics in parenthesis
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.0198

CHAPTER 5
Summary, Conclusions and Directions of Future Research

5.1.

Summary and conclusions of the dissertation
This dissertation provides an analysis of the effect of transfers and trade policy on

the welfare of developing countries. The effects of transfers and trade policy have been
studied since World War I, and the literature has established that transfers affect welfare
though income and prices effects. The income effect represents the transfer of purchasing
power and is welfare enhancing. On the other hand, the price effect represents the
induced change in the terms of trade and reduces welfare under certain conditions. If the
price effect dominates, the recipient of a transfer suffers a net welfare loss. The possible
occurrence of such a transfer paradox has been widely analyzed in the literature.
The effect of trade policy on welfare has also received a lot of attention in the
literature. There is strong evidence in the literature which shows that open trade regimes
improve welfare by eliminating distortions and expanding employment opportunities. As
a result, developing countries have been urged to pursue trade liberalization reforms by
lowering trade barriers. The literature has however not focused on how transfers and
trade policy interact with structural factors to deliver welfare outcomes. The welfare of
developing countries is affected by structural factors such as import dependency and
underemployment.
Production and investment in low income developing countries are highly
dependent on imported capital goods. The imported capital goods are used in the import
competing industrialized sector. The exporting sector focuses on primary products where
land and labor are predominantly used. Growth and thus welfare depends on these
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imports. In addition, underemployment rather than unemployment is the fundamental
problem in developing countries. Trade policy reform in developing countries seeks to
improve welfare by expanding labor intensive employment. The employment gains from
such reform will be very small in the presence of high underemployment. What really
matters from a welfare point of view is how trade policy affects underemployment. The
need to factor these two structural factors in the analysis of the effect of transfers and
trade policy on the welfare of developing countries provided the motivation for
conducting this research.
In chapter 2, we build a two-good general equilibrium model, which takes into
account the use of foreign capital in the import competing sector and the use of land in
the exporting sector producing mainly primary products. Labor is used in both sectors.
The model is used to theoretically analyze how financial transfers and capital transfers to
a developing country affect the welfare of the developing country. In addition, we also
analyze the welfare effect of financial transfers using simulations.
In the case of transfers of financial aid, we find that such transfers induce changes
in commodity terms of trade, which in turn affects capital inflows and the price of
imported capital. If export taxes are taken to be exogenous, we find that endogenous
capital flows aggravate the transfer problem that exists under trade taxation. When trade
liberalization is tied to transfers, we find that the tying of aid may worsen or alleviate the
transfer problem, depending on how the existing export tax compares with the optimum.
To shed more light on the transfer problem in the context of trade liberalization tied to
transfers, we solve the model numerically and conduct simulations. We find that the
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tying of aid results in a welfare loss for the recipient nation, given the functional forms
and parameter values used in carrying out the simulations.
In the case of capital transfers, we find that such transfers affect welfare through a
price effect, a production effect and an income effect. The presence of a trade distortion
causes the price effect and production effect to overcome the income effect. As a result,
the recipient suffers a net welfare loss. The recipient’s welfare falls despite the fact that
productive capacity and hence growth has been increased by the transfer of capital.
Growth is therefore immiserizing.
In conclusion, transfer paradoxes cannot be ruled out in the context of capital
goods. If there is a trade distortion, untied transfers reduce welfare through a value effect
(higher price of imported capital) and a volume effect (greater inflow of capital). Both the
value effect and the volume effect are induced by the price effect of the transfer. The
tying of financial transfers can also lead to a welfare loss. Capital transfers may reduce
welfare by causing immiserizing growth.
Chapter 3 builds an econometric model and empirically analyzes the transfer
problem in the presence of an exogenous export tax and endogenous capital inflows. This
is done by estimating a regression model with fixed effects for a panel of 14 countries in
SSA. Our empirical results show that multilateral transfers significantly reduce terms of
trade. The reduction in terms of trade significantly induces foreign capital inflows.
Increased capital inflows and terms of trade deterioration significantly offset the real
GDP gains from multilateral transfers. The results are consistent with the theoretical
analysis in chapter 2 and are robust.
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To conclude, our results suggest that an additional factor may be relevant in
explaining why SSA’s welfare failed to improve. In the presence of capital imports, the
price effect leads to a volume effect (greater inflow of capital). Both the price effect and
the volume effect offset the income effect. Consequently overall welfare will fall if the
income effect is dominated by the other two effects.
In chapter 4, we develop a two sector general equilibrium model that explicitly
takes into account the employment structure and wage inflexibility of a typical small
open economy. Real wage rigidity in the skilled sector results in underemployment. The
model is used to analyze how trade liberalization affects underemployment and welfare.
We find that liberalizing trade by reducing export taxes expands the unskilled sector and
contracts the skilled sector. These sectoral shifts lead to greater underemployment. The
results also show that liberalizing trade by reducing export taxes has an ambiguous effect
on welfare due to the presence of endogenous underemployment. In fact, free trade is not
optimal: we find that a small export tax leads to a welfare improvement. The reason is
that a small tax reduces underemployment by expanding the skilled sector relative to the
unskilled sector. Welfare increases as a result of the efficiency gains from improved labor
allocation.
We complement the theoretical analysis with an empirical analysis of the effect of
trade liberalization on underemployment. This is done by estimating a regression model
with fixed effects for a panel of 19 developing economies. The empirical results show
that trade liberalization significantly reduces employment in the skilled sector as
predicted by the theoretical model. Robustness checks give the same result. This result
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provides indirect evidence that trade liberalization increases underemployment as
explained by the theoretical model.
The analysis leads us to conclude that there is a conflict between trade
liberalization, underemployment and welfare.

This conflict arises from a failure to

address the structure and functioning of labor markets in small open economies.

5.2.

Directions of future research
In this dissertation we highlighted the importance of policy mistakes in

contributing to SSA’s lack of welfare improvement. It was also noted that inappropriate
forms of transfers may have contributed to the failure of economic reforms to deliver
positive welfare outcomes. Our future research will examine these two issues in relation
to the transfer problem. More specifically, we plan to analyze the effect of multilateral
transfers on policies. The extent to which transfers change policies is useful for welfare
analysis.
Instead of using aggregated data on EDA in the welfare analysis, it may be more
useful to analyze welfare using the more disaggregated data. This will yield information
on the forms taken by EDA such as project aid, import support, and debt relief. We will
also be able to tell which form of aid is tied or untied. By analyzing the effect of
different forms of aid on welfare, we can find out the forms of transfers better suited to
improving welfare. In addition, our future research will analyze the effect of bilateral
transfers on the welfare of developing countries. This will enable us to compare the
welfare effects of multilateral transfers and bilateral transfers. An analysis of the
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determinants of these transfers will also be carried out. Such an analysis will contribute to
a better understanding of the welfare effects of transfers.
As regards trade liberalization and underemployment, our future research will
analyze the effect of other border measures of trade barriers such as quotas and border
delays on skilled employment. In addition, it would be interesting to analyze the effect of
“inside the border” measures of trade barriers such as attitudes towards trade and
identities. In the literature, it has been shown that attitudes towards trade are significantly
correlated with human capital. It has also been shown in the literature that high identities
in the form of high nationalism or patriotism lead to protectionist policies. 36 We will
then be able to assess the effectiveness of border measures vs. “inside the border”
measures in reducing underemployment. Finally, since unemployment is the most widely
used indicator to assess labor market developments as well as economic performance, we
plan to incorporate this variable in future analysis.

36

See for example Mayda and Rodrik (2001). Data on these measures is available from the International
Social Survey Programme dataset.
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Appendix I: Variables used and sources of data

Variable
UA
KI

Definition
The change in real GDP of nation A.
Real imports of capital goods.

Source of data
WDI (World Bank, 2002)
Ndulu (1991), WDI (2002)

p

The terms of trade.

t

Average tariff rate.

T

Real multilateral aid.

imports
GCF
open
growth
inf
s
L

Real imports.
Real gross capital formation.
Trade as a percent of GDP.
GDP per capita growth (annual %).
Inflation.
Employment in the industrial sector as a
percent of total employment.
Value added per person employed in the
manufacturing sector measures labor
productivity.
Gross capital formation as a percent of GDP.
The terms of trade.

GDNG dataset (World
Bank, 2002)
Trade and import barriers
dataset (World Bank, 2003)
Chang, Fernandez-Arias,
and Serven (1998)
WDI (World Bank, 2002)
WDI (World Bank, 2002)
WDI (World Bank, 2002)
WDI (World Bank, 2002)
WDI (World Bank, 2002)
KILM (ILO, 2002)

ē
K
p*
gov
sch

Government final consumption expenditure as
a percent of GDP.
Secondary school gross enrollment ratio.

KILM = Key Indicators of the Labor Market
WDI = World Development Indicators
GDNG = Global Development Network Growth
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KILM (ILO, 2002)
WDI (World Bank, 2002)
GDNG dataset (World
Bank, 2002)
WDI (World Bank, 2002)
WDI (World Bank, 2002)

Appendix II: Political Geography of Africa
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Appendix III: Multilateral Transfers to Sub-Saharan Africa
(a)

IDA Borrowers

Angola
Benin
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Central African Republic
Chad
Comoros
Congo, Dem. Rep.
Congo, Rep.
Côte d'Ivoire
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Gambia, The
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Mozambique
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
São Tomé and Principe
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Somalia
Sudan
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe
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(b)

Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa Eligible for the IMF Poverty Reduction
and Growth Facility (PRGF) as of September 2003

Angola
Benin
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Central African Republic
Chad
Comoros
Congo, Dem. Rep.
Congo, Rep.
Côte d'Ivoire
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Gambia, The
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Mozambique
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
São Tomé and Principe
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Somalia
Sudan
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
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Appendix IV: Technical Appendix for Chapter 4
A.

Equations

1 u
1
X = X (L , Z)

(1)

2
2
s
X = X (ē L , K)

(2)

1
2
1
E(p*(1-t), 1, UA) = p*(1-t)X + X + tp*( X -E1 )

(3)

β(ê)- β(ē)
s
u
v(w ) = v(w ) +
π

(4)

s
s
u
w = w ( ē, w )

(4a)

1
∂X
u
u
p*(1-t)
(L
,
Z)
=
w
u
∂L

(5)

2
∂X
s
s
(ē
L
,
K)
ē
=
w
s
∂L

(6)

u
u
u
L = L (p*, t, w )

(5a)

s
s
s
L = L ( ē, K, w )

(6a)

−u −s
s
s
u
u
u
L (p*, t, w ) = L + L - L ( w ( ē, w ))

(7)
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u
u
w = w (p*,t, ē)

B.

(7a)

Comparative statics for trade liberalization and welfare

Totally differentiating (3) gives:
1
2
2
E dU + tp*E dU = p*d X + d X + t(p*) E dt
u
1u
11

(8)

From (1) and (2):

1
1
1 ∂X
u ∂X
dX =
u d L + ∂ Z dZ
∂L

u
w
u
= p*(1-t) d L

2
2
2 ∂X
s ∂X
s s
dX =
ē
dL
+
dK
=
w
dL
s
∂K
∂L

(9

(10)

u
s
Dividing (10) by (9) and utilizing the result from (7) that d L = -d L , we get:

s
2
dX
p*(1-t) w
1 =u
w
dX

(11)

Using (11) in (8), we get:
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s
s
w +tw
1
2
E dU + tp*E dU = p*(1)
d
X
+
t(p*)
E dt
u
u
1u
11
w

(12a)

s
s
1
dU
w +tw dX
ψ dt = p*(1) dt + t(p*)2 E11
u
w

(12b)

ψ = E + tp*E >0, E <0
u
1u
11

(13)

s
s
s
w
w +tw
=
u (1+t) >1
u
w
w

(14)

From (9):
1
u
dX
w
dt = p*(1-t)

u
dL
dt

(15)

From (5a):
u
u
u
u
∂L
∂L d w
dL
u
dt
dt = ∂ t +
∂w

(16)

Using the implicit function theorem on (5) we obtain (17) and (18):
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u
∂L
=
∂t

1
u
∂X / ∂L
2 1
u 2 <0
(1-t) ∂ X / ∂(L )

u
∂L
u =
∂w

(17)

1
2 1
u 2 <0
p*(1-t) ∂ X /∂ (L )

(18)

From (7a):
u
u ∂w
dt
dw =
∂t

(19a)

Therefore:
u
u
dw
∂w
dt = ∂t

(19b)

Using the implicit function theorem on (7) we obtain

u
∂L
u
∂t
∂w
= s
s <0
u
∂t
∂L
∂w
∂L
s
u
u +
∂w ∂w
∂w

(20)

From (6):
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s
∂L
1
=
s
2 2
s 2 2 <0
∂w
∂ X / ∂ (L ) ē

(21)

From (4):

s
∂w
u
∂w

u
V'(w )
=
s >0
V'(w )

(22)

Substituting (20) into (16) yields:

u
u
s
s
s
u
(∂L /∂t ) (∂ L /∂ w )(∂ w /∂ w )
dL
u
s
s
s
u <0
dt = u
∂L /∂ w + (∂L /∂ w )(∂ w /∂ w )

(23)

1
dX
dU
Therefore dt <0, which implies that dt is ambiguous.
C.

Comparative statics for skilled labor demand

Totally differentiating (6a) gives:

s
s
s
∂L
s ∂L
s
∂L
dL =
dē +
dK +
s dw
∂ē
∂K
∂w

(24)

Total differentiation of (4a) and (7a) gives:
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s

s

s ∂w
u
∂w
dw =
dē +
dw
u
∂ē

(24a)

∂w

u

u

u ∂w
∂w
dP +
dē
dw =
∂ē
∂P

(24b)

Substituting (24a) and (24b) into (24) yields:

s

∂L
dL = γ dē +
dK + δ dP
∂K
s

(24c)

Where:
s

s

s

u

s

∂L
∂w
∂w
∂w
∂L
γ =
+
(
+
)
u
s
∂
ē
∂ē
∂ē

δ =

∂L

s

s
∂w

∂w

∂w

s

u

∂w

∂w

(24d)

∂w
u ∂P <0

(24e)

P = p* (1-t)

(12f)

The effect of trade liberalization on skilled labor demand can be derived from (24c) and
is given by:
s
dL
d t = - δ p*

(25)
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Using the implicit function theorem on (5) and (7) yields:

u
φ (.)
∂L
= >0
∂P
P∂ φ (.)/∂LU

1

(26)

u

φ (.) = ∂X /∂ L

u

u

(26a)

u

s

∂L
∂L
∂w
∂L
= -(
)/(
+
s
∂P
∂ P ∂ wU
∂w

∂w

s

∂w

u ) >0

(26b)

s
dL
Therefore δ <0, implying that d t >0.

From (24c), the effect of effort on skilled labor demand is given by:

s

dL
dē = γ

(27)

Using the implicit function theorem on (4), (6) and (7) yields:

s

∂w
s
= -{β′ (ē)/ π }/ v′ (w ) >0
∂ē

(27a)

s

∂L
s
s
= -{ Φ (.) + ē L ∂ Φ (.)/∂ ē}/ {∂ Φ (.)/∂ L } ē2 > 0
∂ē
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(27b)

2
∂X
s
Φ (.) =
(ē
L
, K)
s
∂L

s
u
s
u
s
∂L
∂L ∂w
∂w
∂L
= -{
s ∂ ē } / { ∂ wU +
s
∂ē
∂w
∂w

(27c)

∂w

s

∂w

u } <0

(27d)

s
dL
Relations (27a) to (27d) imply that dē is ambiguous.
s
Finally the effect of p* and K on L can be obtained from (24c) as follows:
s

dL
dp* = δ (1-t) <0
s

(28)

s

dL
∂L
dK = ∂ K

(29)

Using the implicit function theorem on (6) yields:
s

∂L
s
= -{∂ Φ (.)/∂ K}/ {ē ∂ Φ (.)/∂ L } > 0
∂K
s

dL
Therefore dK > 0.
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(30)

